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 ABSTRACT 
The pension system in Norway has been challenged since the implementation of pension 
reforms in 2011. In line with the expected increase in the future pension burden, the 
government’s intention is to build up an economic and social sustainable pension system, 
motivate people to continue working and provide satisfactory income distribution. The main 
focus of my thesis is the aspect of the pension reforms that raised huge controversy and 
resistance among employees in Norway. A completely reformed occupational pension system 
is supposed to go into effect in 2014 and that might result in substantial shift from defined 
benefit to defined contribution scheme. That further involves active participation of 
employees in retail investment market and eventually managing investment portfolio on their 
own. Are they prepared to be independent players in this market and how successful in 
making decisions are the aspects I have tested in my thesis. 
Experimental results are not so promising. The key findings: 
• Responders struggle to make optimal investment decisions. Male, self-employed, 
wealthier, higher educated and numerate individuals have greater chances to select 
optimal choice 
• Participants have been influenced by behavioural biases and framing effects 
• People are not confident in financial industry and they are quite insecure in retirement 
income adequacy 
• Responders tend to be risk averse, seek to minimise losses rather than maximise gains  
Government regulative of investment retail market and strategic cooperation with the 
employers could make better investment environment and facilitate successful 
implementation of pension reforms. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Norway is one of the countries going through intensive pension reforms. Funded pension 
programs controlled by the private sector become more and more essential in delivering 
retirement income in many countries. As a result ,privately managed pension assets will play 
an important role in financial markets, notably as a source of long-term savings.(The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2012) 
The expected increase in the future pension burden is caused by higher life expectancy and by 
generations born in the years after the Second World War. These generations are now 
reaching the age of retirement. With fewer active workers financing larger share of retirees, 
premium payments become insufficient to cover increased pension expenses. That’s why 
policy makers see pension reforms inevitable. Based on the latest predictions Norway’s 
insurers need to build over NOK 50 billion additional reserves in coming years to cover for 
increasing life expectancy. Long term projections by Statistics Norway predict increase in life 
expectancy over 86 years by 2050 (Reuters, March 2013). 
What does implementation of pension reform involve and why are people in Norway 
concerned about the same? The greater weight on participants owns ability to make retirement 
saving decisions is the main issue of the following reforms. Such a policy of transferring the 
responsibility for retirement saving from the state to individuals places greater demands on 
consumers’ capacity to plan for their pensions. 
The risk employees are exposed to in the new pension arrangements is the main obstacle 
and reason why the pension reforms got bad publicity and was criticized among people 
in Norway. 
Introduced more than a decade ago, pension reforms in Norway caused confusion and some 
controversy. Norwegians became aware of possible effects and importance of their own 
decisions. Retirement income adequacy is uncertain if one is not able to select optimal fund 
choices. That just says how important transparency of the investment retail market is for 
potential investors.  
According to the fourth Consumer Markets Scoreboard 2010, market for the “investments, 
pensions and securities” ranks worst out of fifty consumer markets for overall market 
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 performance; worst for ease of comparing the products and services of different suppliers, 
worst in trust that providers will respect consumer protection rules; forth worst in 
experiencing problems and worst in overall satisfaction. The financial environment has 
evolved so much that consumers are not well prepared to make sound decisions about 
increasingly complex retail financial products.(Chater et al. 2010)  
Why do people keep being trapped, tricked and fooled by financial institutions? Is it possible 
not to make any mistake and always come up with the optimal investment decision?  How do 
you explain irrational behaviour and whether behavioural biases always lead to failure? 
Finding the answers to all these questions and many other related was my motivation to 
analyse and identify factors important in decision making process. 
In an era of market improvements and intensive competition the financial industry ignores the 
most important link in the chain – the consumer. As a result people are left alone in financial 
turmoil. Today, individuals are expected to be ‘homo-economicus’ in order to overcome 
financial traps. ‘Econs’ choose unfailingly well and fits the picture of human beings offered 
by economists(Thaler & Sunstein 2008). 
 
The purpose of my thesis is to investigate decision making processes of consumers in retail 
investment market. The objectives were threefold: 
 - to obtain experimental evidence regarding behavioural biases and cognitive constraints 
that most influencing consumer decision making;  
 -to test for the general knowledge about saving products; 
- to test for the risk attitude in different frames.  
The final results are supposed to give the answers to who is prone to make mistakes in 
selecting the optimal investments and what are the main reasons for choosing sub-optimal 
decisions.  
  
 The pension reform, as currently proposed, would introduce hybrid pension plans that 
appear to be defined contribution (DC).That involves transferring retirement saving 
risk from employer to plan member. In order to better understand each of the current 
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 pension schemes, I found it necessary to briefly introduce the pension system in 
Norway. This will be subject of the next chapter. 
 
 Potential investors follow intuition when making decisions. They are led by big letters, 
sweet bankers’ talks and poor neighbour advices. Even well informed and numerate 
consumers fail to make an optimal decision that just proves existence of behavioural 
biases. The standard economic theory over-simplified human behaviour in making 
decisions, but behavioural approach opened new insights identifying the most 
common obstacles in selecting optimal decisions. Several studies agreed upon: choice 
and information overload, unstable or undefined preferences, heuristic decision-
making, framing effects and investment menu design, myopic behaviour, 
procrastination and inertia, and overconfidence. My intention was to observe the 
results from web survey and if there is a pattern in answering that indicates deviations 
from optimal decisions, than it could be a sign of irrational behaviour.  
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 2. BACKGROUND 
 
2.1. Pension system in Norway 
The Norwegian pension reform was initially announced in 2001 when the government set up 
a special pensions commission consisted of politicians and independent experts. The 
Parliament of Norway adopted the new regulations in the spring of 2009. The reform is 
supposed to be fully implemented in 2025. The new regulations of the new "Flexible 
Retirement Act" have been implemented gradually since 2010. The reason for introducing 
new regulations in the retirement plans schemes was to be able to maintain a sustainable 
pension system in order to handle an increase in the number of retired Norwegians/higher life 
expectancy, while at the same time less children are born. The pension reform is therefore 
aimed to encourage more people to stay for a longer period in the workforce after retirement 
age.1  
The Government pension fund Norway was valued at NOK 154,9 billion at the end of the 
2012.(Statistics Norway 2012). 
Statistical table provides good insight of the structure of pension fund assets in Norway.
         
Figure 2.1 Government Pension Fund-Balance Sheet ( Source: Statistics Norway 2012) 
1 Source: http://www.nav.no/Pensjon/Tjenestepensjoner 
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 The Norwegian pension system consists of three parts: National Insurance scheme, different 
occupational schemes and various forms of savings especially for retirement. 
 
Figure 2.2: The Norwegian pension system structure 
National Insurance Scheme was introduced in 1967 and represents mandatory insurance and 
pension scheme managed by Norwegian Labour and Welfare Service (NAV). The financing 
of the state pensions of National Insurance is based on a "Pay as you go" system. Today’s 
work force is making the payments for the current retirees. When National Insurance was 
introduced it was 3,9 actively employed person per pensioner. This ratio today is 2,6 and it is 
predicted that in 2050 will be 1,8.That implies major rise in National Insurance costs and 
questions sustainability of the system without radical pension reforms.2 
Occupational pensions were established by employers to provide pension and related 
benefits for their employees.  In 2006 the Mandatory Occupational Pension (called 
"Obligatorisk tjenestepensjon" or OTP in Norwegian) was introduced in Norway. Before this, 
occupational pensions had been mandatory in the public and optional in private sectors. It 
means that a large proportion of private sector employees were not part of an occupational 
pension scheme. According to Statistics Norway out of 2,540,000 employees in Norway less 
than 2,192,000 had an occupational pension at the end of 2011.Approximately 1,375,000 
employees who had an occupational pension worked in private sector. Insurance companies 
with the DNB liv and Storebrand are the main actors in the private sector market. The 
individual companies decide whether it will be a contribution scheme or a scheme based on 
the putting part of the employee’s salary aside for them to have at retirement. The premium 
and the pension costs for the OTP pension scheme are paid by the employer. The minimum 
contribution is 2% of the salary funds.3 
Private pension schemes; It is voluntary if someone wants to enter into savings or pension 
agreement in order to make pension larger. It is possible for an individual to save in unit trust 
 
2,3,https://www.spk.no/Global/Arsberetninger/%C3%A5rsberetning%202011/SPK%20in%20brief_the%20pensio
n%20system.pdf 
3.Private 
pension 
schemes 
2.Occupational 
pensions 
1.National insurance 
scheme 
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 scheme enter into an individual private pension agreement with a bank or insurance 
company.4 
2.2. Pension schemes in Norway 
Employees in public sector have been covered by occupational pension for several years. A 
new legislation from 2006 regulated a mandatory occupational pension for the employees also 
in private sector. Occupational pension are either defined benefit schemes, where the pension 
for the employee is fixed, or defined contribution schemes, where the payment to the fund is a 
fixed percentage of the personal income. In private sector you can have both, but in public 
sector there are only defined benefit schemes. Defined benefit schemes(DB) can be 
established in life insurance companies or in pension funds, while defined contribution 
schemes(DC) also can be established in banks and mutual funds management 
companies.(Broadbent et al. 2006) 
2.2.1. Defined benefit schemes 
A defined benefit scheme is a pension scheme where the benefits payable to the employee on 
retirement are determined by the use of a formula, either alone or in combination with a 
guaranteed minimum amount payable. (Broadbent et al. 2006) 
An employee's retirement benefits are calculated by averaging the employee's earnings during 
the last few years of employment (or, alternatively, averaging an employee's earnings for 
somebody’s entire career), taking a specified percentage of the average, and then multiplying 
it by the employee's number of years of service.5 
The risk of a defined benefit scheme to provide an adequate income in retirement is borne by 
the employer. In Norway, the payment guaranties a pension on a certain level in addition to 
National insurance, or that the payment is a fixed percentage level of their salary. You can 
have defined benefit schemes in life insurance companies or in pension funds.(Statistics 
Norway 2012) 
2.2.2. Defined contribution schemes 
A defined contribution scheme is a pension scheme where the benefits are defined exclusively 
in terms of the level of the fund built up from the contribution made over the employee's 
4https://www.spk.no/Global/Arsberetninger/%C3%A5rsberetning%202011/SPK%20in%20brief_the%20pension
%20system.pdf 
 
5 http://www.axa-equitable.com/retirement/understanding-defined-benefit-plans.html 
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 working life. The increases in value of these funds depend of the yield on the investment and 
the saving period. The entire risk of the scheme to provide an adequate income in retirement 
is thus borne by the employee (source: Eurostat). In 2001, companies were allowed to 
establish defined contribution schemes with tax deduction. Defined contribution schemes can 
be established in life insurance companies, pension funds, banks and mutual funds 
management companies.(Tapia & Yermo 2007) 
The transition from DB to DC plans in private sector pensions is shifting investment risk from 
the corporate sector to households. Households are therefore becoming increasingly exposed 
to financial markets, and retirement income may be subject to greater variability than before. 
That means in DB employer promises to pay you a certain amount at retirement and is 
responsible for making sure that there are enough funds in the plan to eventually pay out this 
amount, even if plan investments don't perform well. DC plan implies no obligation by 
employer for specified payment amount at retirement. Instead, the amount you receive at 
retirement will depend on the investments you choose and how those investments 
perform.(Tapia & Yermo 2007) 
One could ask why traditional DB pension plans are gradually losing their dominance in the 
occupational pension systems of many countries. Norway is still in early stage of reforming 
pension system and DB plans are still dominant, so we can reformulate the question what are 
the factors influencing the shifts from DB to DC plans in future? 
 Factors such as increased workforce mobility associated with demographic and industrial 
change appear to have been important drivers of the shift away from DB pension plans. All 
else being equal, mobile workers have less of a preference for DB pensions mostly because 
benefits of this plan are not portable from one employer to another. Unless the DB pension 
plan is portable, which is uncommon in private sector plans, the backloading of DB plan 
benefits is huge for employees who change employers during their working career. Blake 
(2003) estimated the accrual losses from DB pension schemes under different assumptions. 
He found that a typical U.K. worker who changed the job around 6 times during their working 
career would suffer a loss of 25-30 per cent of the full service benefit they would have 
received had they remained with the same employer throughout their career ( Bodie, et.al, 
1985). 
While the evolution towards DC pension plans can be beneficial for both employees and 
employers, there is a large body of evidence to suggest that there is substantial inertia and 
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 myopia regarding retirement decisions, which may eventually threaten the capacity of DC 
plans to provide retirement security. These are just some of the behavioural biases that have 
great impact on decision making and that will be of the interest through my thesis. 
For example, some studies have shown that in some DC plans employees are generally 
investing too heavily in their own company’s stock. Furthermore, employees tend to remain in 
a plan’s default option even if it does not provide sufficient portfolio diversification. Finally, 
employees in DC plans may not have an adequate number of investment options to create a 
portfolio suited for their investment goals, risk tolerance and constraints. Retirement security 
for some households is threatened by a lack of participation, low contribution rates, 
suboptimal asset allocation and early withdrawals. All those obstacles easily might be rooted 
in well documented behavioural biases and lack of basic financial literacy. Thus it is 
important for policymakers to address these issues. The experience of some institutional 
investors in emerging markets that created mandatory private pension funds may also be 
relevant for other countries moving from DB to DC schemes.(Broadbent et al. 2006) 
 
  
8 
 
 3. BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMIC APROACH 
 
This chapter will serve as a theoretical framework through the evidences from Behavioural 
Economics (BE) literature related to consumer decision making in retail finance. 
Since the main goal of this research is identification of the most vulnerable categories of 
consumers and factors that make them sensitive towards complexity of Investment retail 
products, I will stand out the most critical behavioural factors already observed in BE 
literature and later through my hypothesis shed light on some specifics. 
Bringing together psychology and financial economics, behavioural finance approach stands 
out numerous biases. Exactly those ones in most cases are the reasons for the deviations from 
rational behaviour. Better understanding and higher level of awareness of behavioural biases 
might lead to less mistakes and better investment decisions.  
3.1. Prospect theory and conventional weaknesses 
Based on conventional economics, individuals would invest and hold a portfolio of financial 
assets with a risk-return combination consistent with their investment horizon, degree of risk 
aversion and the portfolio of other assets they hold, including their human capital. Emotions 
and other extraneous factors wouldn’t influence people, they are typically rational and self- 
interested. In other words, people would be perfectly sensible, calculating machines.(Tapia & 
Yermo 2007) 
Behavioural economists, on the other side, observe how people actually behave and usually 
their findings show that human beings are irrational. Rational economics stands on the firm 
foundation but some of the assumptions –people always make the best decisions, the mistakes 
are less likely when the decisions involve a lot of money, the market is self-correcting-can 
clearly lead to disastrous consequences.(Ariely 2010) 
It is important to understand behavioural finance as supplement to standard theory of finance, 
as it is comparison of prospect theory with respect to the expected utility theory. 
Understanding the prospect and expected utility theory underlies real investors behaviour 
therefore I’m standing out some main features where these two theories have different views 
(Hogarth 1987).  
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 Table 3.1:Prospect Theory vs. Expected Utility Theory(Hogarth 1987) 
Prospect theory Expected Utility theory 
 
1. Due to complexity of choice problems and 
decision maker’s limited information-
processing ability, preferences are not 
consistent. The way of presentation of 
alternatives strongly influences individual’s 
decision. 
 
 
1. Decision maker can value the alternatives 
on the attractiveness of each one, preferences 
are consistent ,ordered, not influenced how 
the alternatives are presented to the decision 
maker 
 
2. Decision makers do not always choose the 
alternative with highest utility result, decision 
weights are not linear, people give unlikely 
events more weights than they deserve. 
 
2. The alternatives are determined by 
multiplying expected outcome by their 
probabilities (e.g., a 1% chance of winning 
$1000 is better than a 99% chance to win 
$10)?  
 
3. People have tendency to view outcome 
from a subjective reference point. Decision 
makers make choices as deviation from 
current reference and they are more sensitive 
to losses than they are to gains. 
 
3.  Evaluation of alternatives is made from a 
single, unchanging reference point that is 
based on comprehensive understanding of 
different states of wealth. Decision makers 
make choices based on the change of the 
final outcome not whether the change is a 
gain or a loss. 
4. Decision makers are risk averse when 
making decisions among alternatives that 
result in gains, and risk seeking when making 
decisions among alternatives that result in 
losses.(Figure 3.1) 
4.  Investors are risk averse. Utility function 
is concave downward for all levels of wealth. 
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 I would give a bit more space to the last point since this principle has large implications and 
evidences in real behaviour of investors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                    
Figure 3.1: Kahneman&Tversky’s Value function (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) 
In summary, value function as essence of prospect theory is i) determined on deviations from 
the reference point,(ii) concave for gains and convex for losses ,(iii) steeper for losses than for 
gains.(Kahneman & Tversky 1979) 
Those properties of value function actually depict big part of irrational behaviour. Value 
function shows sharp asymmetry in approaching the gains and losses, weighting the losses 
about twice as heavily as gains (losing the 1$ is twice as painful as the pleasure of gaining 
1$). This phenomenon is called loss aversion. It can be also expressed as a tendency for 
taking the risk when individual is confronted with losses.(Kahneman & Tversky 1979) Loss 
aversion also confirms that the decision making is sensitive to the way the choices are 
described ( more about framing effects in following sections).  
In reality investment decision process is followed by several obstacles and behavioural 
challenges. Many individuals are not particularly good at the retirement savings planning 
either because they lack the necessary cognitive ability to solve the optimization problem, 
because they have insufficient will power to execute it, or even sometimes because they are 
overconfident. Surveys and empirical researches show that individuals do not follow the 
traditional assumptions about rational economic decision-making. Investors can and do try to 
maximize self-interest but not rare results are not optimal. The regularly observed deviations 
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 in process of making decision violate the assumptions of conventional economics. They are 
essence and central part of the interests of behavioural economics.  My intention is to detect 
those triggers of non-logical decisions, analyse them and through the results of my research 
identify the main reasons of errors in investment decision making. Growing body of 
evidences indicates and several analyses agreed about the main obstacles  - choice and 
information overload, unstable or undefined preferences, heuristic decision-making, framing 
effects and investment menu design, myopic behaviour, procrastination and inertia, and 
overconfidence.(Tapia & Yermo 2007)  
These are most frequently represented factors in literature served to explain consumer’s 
decisions and deserve full attention of researchers since they are reasons of irrational and sub-
optimal decisions. The special place in shaping the investment choices has level of financial 
literacy and numerical ability therefore I would stand out this point as well. 
After thoroughly describing above mentioned behavioural determinants, we will have general 
picture of investment decision maker. Further we will see how EU study(Chater et al. 2010) 
see typical European investment consumer, which can be good benchmark for the results of 
my survey and guide to final conclusions. 
3.2. Choice and information overload 
Consumer’s determination often calls into the question with the increased range of possible 
investment options. 
Most of the research analyses confirmed that extending the range of the investment 
alternatives decreases contribution  rates as a result of information overload and complexity of 
given options. As the result, default option stands out as easiest way out among consumer’s 
solutions. Tapia and Yermo (2007) thoroughly analysed advantages and disadvantages of 
simplified investment packages vs. packages with many investment options through case 
study among two groups of countries. 
They analysed Australia and Sweden as countries with almost unlimited investment options 
and Latin American (Chile, Mexico, Peru), Central and Eastern European (Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia and Slovakia) and Hong Kong as an examples of countries with more limited range of 
choices. 
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 Large international evidence together with this study have just confirmed that increasing the 
investment alternatives in the pension plan design creates information overload which further 
results with the default option as investor’s choice. Percentages of individuals who made 
active choice is significantly greater in Chile ( around 74%) and especially in Central and 
Eastern European countries (over 85%) than Australia and Sweden(less than 10%).(Tapia & 
Yermo 2007)  
Agnew and Szykman (2004) went further and looked at the information complexity through 
more than one perspective including number of investment choices as well. They analysed 
presentation of products, number and similarity between investment options. 
Actually many variables can contribute overload. Investors experience less information 
overload when it comes to asset allocation when information about investment alternatives is 
presented in easier way to obtain and evaluate. That means presentation of information can be 
one of the important reasons causing the possible information overload. 
Another source is already mentioned in context of number of investment choices influencing 
decreasing contribution rate, now affecting active investment choice. Tendency towards the 
investment default can be explained within Sweden’s public pension private accounts 
characterised with extreme number of choices. Over 80% of new participants in Sweden can 
be described and put into category of consumers with’ path of least resistance ‘. (Agnew & 
Szykman 2004) 
The similarity between investment options might be third potential source of information 
overload. Namely, in cases where participants choose among several vendors, it is high of 
possibility that the vendors offer similar types of funds. Similarities between offered funds 
make harder for individual to distinguish them which cause overload and obstacle for making 
the optimal decision.(Agnew & Szykman 2004) 
Results from above mentioned research showed that plan design can help some of the 
investors. The research analysis also observed that individuals with higher financial 
knowledge felt less information overload when given fewer investment choices while low 
educated participants have been overwhelmed regardless of the plan features, which indicates 
financial literacy as very important in decision making. 
Since the issue of active choices, default option and pension plan design is strongly related 
with procrastination and inertia it will be analysed in some of the following sections. 
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 Information overload is just one of the features of investment retail market that with many 
other (hidden ,equivocal information etc.) contributes to ‘complexity and fogginess’ of 
products provided by this market.(Chater et al. 2010) 
Carlin (2009) discussed issues related to retail financial markets pointing out deliberately 
creation of complexity prices. There are several ways of making prices more complex. 
Decomposing the prices through direct fees and indirect involuntary surcharges makes 
confusing to compute the actual price of the product. Different method of disclosure (new 
technical language for disclosures of the prices) makes prices difficult to compare. Leaving 
out important information in a disclosure blurs the real picture of the products. For example, 
low-price mutual fund stands out low management fee but high-price fund answered with 
advertising no management fee at all, but hiding much higher indirect costs, so people might 
be confused taking the latter option as optimal one.  
Under such circumstances individual is obviously forced to be perfectly cautious, updated, 
keen, discerning to recognize the best deal in the market. Is it description of the average 
consumer of financial products? 
Unfortunately financial institutions are taking advantage of naïve consumers by consciously 
making financial products complicate. Strategic price complexity allows producers to keep 
market power and that’s the reason why this problematic issue should be matter of higher 
instances.(Carlin 2009) 
3.3. Unstable or undefined preferences 
Benartzi and Thaler (2001) have been testing the investment portfolio within retirement 
participant’s plan. They discovered relatively weak preferences for the portfolio participants 
elected. Workers were given an option of holding the portfolio they originally selected and 
portfolio created as the statistical average of their colleagues. They expressed more 
preferences towards portfolio of average participant. Further observations come from 
Netherland where national survey confirmed unstable preferences to asset allocation. The 
typical individual possesses conservative portfolio with the stocks making up 30% of the 
average portfolio, but after disclosing the mean risk portfolio (larger share of stocks) they 
opted for the riskier option. In both cases responders showed not remarkable skills required to 
control their own pension investment portfolio. Lack of determination when it comes to asset 
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 allocation might stem from insufficient understanding of the choices offered or low level of 
financial literacy, but also it can be out of some other behavioural biases.(Collard 2009) 
3.3.1. Herding 
There are two main reasons why herd behaviour appears. First one is desire of individual to be 
accepted in the group, and second is followed by logic that majority is less likely wrong. Herd 
behaviour takes important role in explanation of generation of speculative bubbles. Fashion 
and fad are synonyms for this kind of behaviour and unfortunately it occupies majority 
involving even rational individuals into irrational groups. Many financial market players even 
having thoughts about correct price of equity, refrain and do not want to combat the herd. 
Unfortunately, interpersonal communication, ’word of mouth’, more than any media influence 
making decisions, people generally trust friends, relatives, co-workers. Herding is not usually 
profitable investment decision. It’s very difficult to catch the right investment timing. By the 
time herd investor finds out about the trend many others already had taken advantage which 
means entering at that point might often result in losing the money.(Hede 2012) 
3.3.2. Anchoring  
People may attach their thoughts for the reference point (anchor) and out of it derivate 
prediction and make decisions. Considering the valuation of the stock market prices for 
instance, it’s not hard to tell that estimation of stock prices based on past one or recent 
remembered one, is often way to be led astray. Company stock can drop in value due to lose 
of big customer and consequently big decline in revenue, but naïve investor observes the 
decrease of the prices as the chance to buy the same on discount because of anchoring on 
recent ‘high’ price. In other words anchoring is superficial and ignoring the underlying 
fundamentals of such a changes might be disappointing for investor.(Hede 2012) 
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 3.4. Heuristic decision making 
The rational decision making is not guaranteed once investor gathers all relevant information 
and objectively evaluates the same. Actually the real headache starts at that moment. People 
have been showered with large amount of information that drives them to apply ‘mental short-
cuts’ or heuristics. In case of pension savings for instance, people face with the complex 
sequence of choices when allocate their money in different options. First they need to decide 
whether to rely on default option or make active choice. If they make active choice, they are 
supposed to know how many funds they will invest in and which one to choose. Finally, 
individual have to decide what percentage should be invested in each fund. Existence of “1/n” 
strategy also called naïve diversification strategy is example of heuristics in making 
investment decisions. Following this shortcut participant simply split their contribution 
equally between funds offered by the plan. People also rely on historic return (over the past 
few years) even though good results as indicators easily could be due to the luck and in that 
way give the wrong picture.(Tapia & Yermo 2007) 
Heuristic in making decisions is widely applied among investors typically with the complex 
problems and incomprehensible information. When time is pressure ‘rule of thumb’ is way to 
reduce complexity and ease decision process. Unfortunately results of this investment 
decision approach are often sub-optimal.   
3.5. Familiarity and representatives 
Those two behavioural biases also affect decision process in a way to ignore the objective 
considerations. 
There are several aspects of familiarity but I will point out one related to investing in your 
own company or brand you already know. Overweighting domestic companies or the ones 
somebody work for can be explained as comfort seeking and optimism about their markets 
relative to foreign markets. It is the fact that many investors put high percentage of their 
wealth in employer’s stocks and in that way forgo possible diversification and jeopardize their 
initial investment.(Hede 2012) 
One more common mistake one might make is to judge the thing by how it appears than how 
statistically likely it is. 
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 Looking at the interesting example provided by Kahneman & Tversky, this bias is highly 
presented. In this task, responders got description of one 31-year-old female person, single, 
out spoken very bright graduated in philosophy, concerned back in her student days with the 
issues of discrimination and equality. Responders were given two options: a) person work in 
bank b) person work in bank and is active in the feminist movement. Even though there must 
be always more people who work in banks than who work in banks and active in feminist 
movement, majority went for b) option. Responders have been blinded being driven by 
narrative description rather than by the logic and statistically probability.  
How this bias found place in investment activities? Companies with high quality 
management, a strong image, good reputation, brand, consistent growth in earnings keep the 
attention, attract investors but not by default guarantee good investment. Serious estimator 
would take into account future cash flow discounted back to the present using appropriate risk 
adjusted discount rate. It implies good company will sell at high prices and bad at low prices 
but once market adjusted no reasons to favour any of those ones. In other words many 
investors are deceived that good company is necessarily representative of a good investment. 
(Hede 2012) 
3.6.  Framing effects 
Framing is phenomenon where people alter decision making process by the different 
formulation of given options (Shefrin 2000). Many scientists dedicated intensive observations 
related to this cognitive bias because it has huge importance in particularly risky decision 
making ( e.g. financial planning).I will go through couple of examples to explain how framing 
can significantly change one’s opinion in different interests area. 
I already mentioned that prospect theory suggest different approach when it is about gains 
than in case with the losses. Reframing the same question causes different effect and this 
phenomenon is analysed by Kahneman and Tversky: Participants were asked to choose 
between two treatments in sample of 600 people affected by deadly disease. In first treatment 
400 people die while in second 33% chance no people die and 66% everyone die. (Kahneman 
& Tversky 2000) 
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 Positive framing: 
If program I is adopted, 200 people will be saved (72%) 
If program II is adopted, 33% that 600 will be saved and 66% that no people will be saved 
(28%) 
Or 
Negative framing: 
If program I is adopted, 400 people will die (22%) 
If program II is adopted, 33% that nobody will die and 66% that 600 people will die (78%) 
Percentages in brackets show us responder’s results indicating risk averse in ‘lives saved 
version and risk seeking in ‘lives lost’ even both are the same in real terms. 
Analogous to previous example, looking at the different approach to the gains and losses, if 
we apply to the gamble with monetary outcomes we got the same conclusion: 
Choice between: 
I      A: a sure gain of $3000      B: 80% chance to gain $4000,and 20% chance to gain nothing     
II    C: a sure loss of $3000        D: 80% to lose $4000, and 20% to lose nothing 
Results indicate the same, risk aversion with the sure gain over the positive gamble in the first 
frame, and risk seeking choice for the gamble over the sure loss in the second framing. Both 
of the choices are mathematically irrational in respect to the expected value.(Fontaine 2005) 
As we could see, the options could be framed in different ways, and invariance means that 
changes don’t have effect on final decision. It’s obvious that framing effect causes violation 
of invariance. Since invariance is psychologically unfeasible, only way to guarantee the same 
is to get back to beliefs of conventional economics. Considering the decisions in terms of total 
assets rather than in terms of gains and losses would be good assumption for avoiding the 
violation of invariance. But reality is different, failure of invariance is established through the 
field and laboratory experiments. People do evaluate the option with the respect to the 
reference point that is implied by the statement of the problem, and choice option is definitely 
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 influenced by non-linearity of decision weights as a result of framing phenomenon. 
(Kahneman & Tversky 2000) 
There are numerous examples how framing shapes our minds, but I will stay within the range 
of the matter of my topic. I would extend this analyse on one more case where frame can be 
efficient tool in purchasing the insurance. This time responders have the choice between a 
sure loss of $50 and 25% chance to lose $200.It is reported that over 80% of subjects 
expressed risk seeking preference for the gamble over the sure loss, in other words, just 20% 
were ready to accept sure loss of $50.But when they were asked if they are willing to pay $50 
for the insurance against a 25% risk of losing the $200, 65% of responders decided to pay. So 
what happened? Obviously perception of payment as the cost of protection is way more 
acceptable than the same amount of money defined as a loss.(Kahneman & Tversky 2000) 
Back in time when credit cards were introduced, lobbyists of the same one advocates for the 
label of price difference between credit card and cash purchase as a cash discount rather than 
a credit card surcharge. The same reason stays behind the producers intention to mark the 
food as 90% fat free than 10% fat product. Frame powering is applied widely to manipulate 
deliberately in a favour of one of the options. People unfortunately tend to be mindless, 
passive and unaware, that’s one of the reasons why framing works.(Thaler & Sunstein 2008)
  
3.7. Overconfidence 
Overconfidence is tendency for people to overestimate theirs ability to perform a particular 
task. Several studies identify huge part of overconfidence in investor behaviour (Fama 1998, 
Shefrin 2002, Barberis/Thaler 2003, Glaser/Noth/Weber 2004). There are several downsides 
of this behavioural bias. Overconfident investor will most likely trade frequently, being sure 
in his superior ability to pick the stocks or time of entry/exit of a position. As a result, trading 
costs might reach significant amount of money and multiplying by the years, one loses 
compounded interest you could have earned on that money as well. Barber and Odean (2000) 
conducted the study of the trading histories of more than 60000 households and found that 
investors who traded most frequently earned 11,4% net return, while those who traded least 
frequently earned 18,1% net return. Many people overrate themselves and as consequence put 
too much money in best idea increasing the risk of under diversifying. 
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 Beside illusion of knowledge, literature states one more factor of overconfidence and that is 
illusion of control. When an investor has early success, he tends to address that one to his own 
abilities even it could be possibly random or the result of the general movements in the 
market. (Tapia & Yermo 2007) Interestingly, survey results show that male investor exhibits 
more overconfidence than female investors. 
As for the most of the behavioural biases, overconfident might be mitigated with being aware 
of and controlling natural temperaments. 
3.8. Myopic Loss aversion, Procrastination, Inertia 
Myopia, in Greek, means close to eyes, or free translation in economic terms, short term 
satisfaction over the long term reward. Economic agents often make bad decision out of ‘near-
sightedness’. The most common symptom of economic myopia is tendency and bias towards 
immediate benefits and not clear, blurred distance vision. (American Optometric Association 
1997) Myopic behaviour is widely present through investment behaviour in financial markets 
and saving for the retirement. Since retirement is long term distant, it looks that if saving 
starts later in life no big differences will make. That means procrastination as a result of 
myopia has huge implication not just on individuals retirement, but also important 
governmental issue (low saving rate and overconsumption).  
Myopia as observed behavioural bias, undermines assumptions of conventional theory and 
one more time shows weaknesses of real economic agent model. Hyperbolic discount theory 
as alternative to discount utility theory offers advanced approach in inter-tempolar choice 
explanation where immediate outcomes are discounted at the higher rates than the outcomes 
in far-away future. In behavioural literature individuals lack of self-control and that stems 
from impatience and impulsivity.(Thaler & Hersh 1981) 
Changing the investment allocation, for instance, to get optimal saving strategy is complex 
decision therefore induces inertia (keep the things as they are) and procrastination (put the 
decision off until tomorrow). Those biases are relevant especially when pension participants 
play active role in financial retirement planning (defined contribution plan). People beside 
great desire and high awareness of the importance of saving for retirement can’t find the 
‘power ‘to execute the same. (Tapia & Yermo 2007) 
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 Several research analyses clearly indicate presence and effects of these behavioural biases. 
Many of them are closely related to the pension plan design, investment allocation and its 
structure. 
In well-known work ‘Myopic Loss Aversion and Equity Premium Puzzle’ Thaler and 
Benartzi continued to analyse why equity premium is so large, or how demand for the bonds 
still exists beside the historically confirmed huge discrepancy between the returns on stocks 
and fixed income securities. The answers on these questions came from psychology of 
decision making through two concepts. First one, loss aversion, already mentioned higher 
sensitivity to reductions of individual’s welfare than increase, and second mental accounting 
as the implicit methods of evaluating the outcomes. It was found that when decision makers 
are loss averse, they are ready to take more risk if they don’t evaluate their performance 
frequently. That means as investment period of holding stocks increase, more attractive asset 
will be, as long as the performances are not evaluated frequently. Put another way, two factors 
contribute aversion towards equity holding, loss aversion and short evaluation period-myopic 
loss aversion.(Thaler & Benartzi 1995) 
Of course, this is just one of the explanations for the structure of investment portfolio, but for 
sure one that indicate great insight of average investor’s behaviour. Even long term investors 
focus on short term result and in that way applies myopia to investing. Important behaviour 
feature that can be explanation for investing decision procedure is also observed in my 
conducting survey. 
It’s interesting to notice how agency problem can cause the myopic loss aversion. Namely as 
stated earlier, stocks will most likely outperform bonds as investment period is extended to 
infinity. In defined benefit pension plan, firms guarantee the pension and pension fund 
manager is supposed to get best out of the asset allocation how firm would have to make 
smaller contributions. Since managers don’t have infinite period of time in one company, and 
reports on returns of the funds’ assets are in short horizon, they put personal interests over the 
stakeholder’s. That is why plan designs might be short sighted and not in interest of 
employees.(Thaler & Benartzi 1995) 
Consequences of procrastination and inertia could manifest through behaviour as ‘path of 
least resistance’. That means among other given options, default option, as the option which 
will be assigned to investor if he does nothing, will be chosen by most participants. 
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 If we look at the graph bellow,(Figure 3.2) from the inspiring paper by Eric Johnson and 
Daniel Goldstain, representing the percentage of people who would be interested in giving the 
organs to donation, we will see how choice architecture is important in decision making. Why 
do people in some countries are more willing to donate their organs than in other countries? 
The answer that arises would be that the results has to have something about culture, religion, 
caring about society, but plot shows us different results between similar pairs of countries(e.g. 
Denmark and Sweden). The right answer is actually that design of the form of question about 
donation shaped the decision. In countries where form is set as ‘check this box if you want to 
participate in the organ donation program’, people do not check and don’t become participant. 
In countries where the form is set as ‘check the box if you do not want to participate in the 
organ donation program’, people also do not check the box and became automatically a part 
of the program.(Ariely 2008) 
In this experiment framing effect with inertia together influence the decision making. It is 
proved again that people can’t cope with the difficulty and emotionality of decisions, in these 
situations they don’t know what to do and resort to default option (the same when people 
making investment and retirement decisions). 
 
Figure 3.2: Effective consent rates for donation organ program, by country: Opt-In, gold, Opt- out, blue.  
Source:(Ariely 2008) 
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 Considering the power of choice architecture, automatic enrolment can be perfect tool for 
increasing the contribution rate. Person would get the form indicating that he will be enrolled 
in the plan unless actively fills out a form requesting to opt out. That was the way how 
participation in U.S. defined contribution plan effectively increased.(Thaler & Sunstein 2008) 
We should also keep in mind and be aware that default option is not necessary the optimal 
decision. The priority in designing might be minimizing the costs for the employers rather 
than best alternative, or it can be reflection of the asset allocation of an average investor. As a 
result such an option tends to be conservative and inadequate for investor’s future retirement.  
3.9. Financial literacy 
Not so long ago basic literacy was defined as ability to read and write, but modern world 
moves further every day imposing new and higher criteria. In a world of improved 
technology, informatics literacy took over that role. Looking from that perspective, acting in 
the financial markets with new and complex financial products, without knowing basic 
financial principals, would be the same as reading the books and not knowing the letters. 
Quoting the Peter Drucker : ”Today knowledge has power. It controls access to opportunity 
and advancement”. In order to make sound financial decision now that will effect well-being 
in future, one needs to understand basics of financial mathematics and investment concepts, 
including terms of compound interest, discounting of future income and inflation effect on 
consumption, risk and return trade-offs, necessity of diversifying.(Clark 2012) 
Large body of evidence shows that financial illiteracy has strong effect on low level of saving, 
poor risk diversification and inefficient portfolio allocation. At the same time many analyses 
have established insufficient level of financial capability required to make optimal investment 
decision. Basically it is found that better educated individuals have higher relevant knowledge 
therefore better investment decisions. Several studies showed that education, wealth and 
experience with risky investments are the characteristics that make investor less likely to 
make investment mistakes (e.g. to under-diversify, selling the wining and holding the losing 
stocks).One for sure, groups with the lack of financial knowledge have been exposed much 
more to behavioural biases therefore described as irrational investors.(Chater et al. 2010) 
There are some opposite opinions about effects of financial education on investment 
behaviour where one group of researchers expressed suspicious of its significance, which is 
most likely because of nature of this variable. Education is long term process and it is not 
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 strange when seminars and sponsored programs don’t give instant results knowing the 
complexity of financial instruments. It is hard to believe that financial illiterate individual 
might become sophisticated investor in short term, but it may be feasible to teach them some 
basics about savings and investments that would increase quality in their decisions. 
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 4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS AMONG 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
4.1. Retail investment purchase process  
In the previous chapter my intention was to disclose the main behavioural biases and explain 
the most common obstacles and mistakes individuals make in retail investors market. Those 
deviations shape the irrational investors’ behaviour. How this tailored behaviour fits into 
investment retail market among Europeans countries will be subject in this section. 
All results and findings in this section will be taken out of EU study:” Consumer decision 
making in retail investment services: A behavioural economics perspective” by Chater et 
al.2010. 
The most dominant types of investment products in EU are stocks and shares, personal 
pensions, life insurance and funds. Of course this is general picture and there are some 
differences between the countries (e.g. different pension systems).The main purpose of RIS 
purchase stated by consumers are saving for the future and effective use of extra income. 
Significant number of investors is confused about the nature of their investment, especially 
when it is about structure of pensions and equity exposure. Also one in four purchasers of 
stocks and shares think that they have fixed rate of return and guaranteed minimum rate.  
In order to recognize some of the biases noted before the purchase process will be broken 
down into the three main stages: information search, consideration and choice. In first one, 
purchasers search for general information about available options, in the second stage, using 
the heuristics they tend to narrow down the number of choices and in the final stage making 
in-depth assessment of the rest of the option results in one final choice. 
 The most common used sources of information are financial websites, employees from 
financial companies, newspapers and magazines. The greatest impact on making decisions 
have advises from financial advisors(34%) ,but still having in mind that friends, relatives and 
colleagues (22%) also have quite influence on investors. It is interesting to note that in the 
first phase of purchase process people generally don’t put a lot of effort into researching, only 
a third of purchasers consider more than one provider. Many purchasers apply ‘recognition 
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 heuristic’ to filter out alternatives and come to ones that will analyse more in depth. Investors 
feel comfortable to rely on familiar provider and in that way they limit time for search and 
overcome disability for setting the real criteria. After evaluating the most attractive options 
more into details, finding the optimal one for individual is led by different reasons. The final 
decision is most influenced by risk (35%) than by return as criterion (13%). Familiarity with 
the selected option is third cited reason. (Chater et al. 2010)       
Further EU research categorizes purchasers into four groups depends on different approach to 
each of the above described stages in purchasing process.  That means stage ‘information 
search’ might be marked as research, if   investor did price comparison through websites, as 
informal advice,if one look for the advice from friends, colleagues, relatives, as formal advice 
,if one look for the financial adviser ,as knowledge ,if one relies on his ability and found easy 
to evaluate the best option and uninformed, as somebody who didn’t have time to consider the 
alternatives. ‘Consideration’ stage factors are shopped around, as sign of spending a lot of 
time looking for option and recognition heuristic, considering the investment from the 
companies which have been recommended.(Chater et al. 2010) 
Based on EU study, four types of purchaser profiles are:     
Confused mainstream (CM) - not being extreme with any of the factors except uninformed. 
This investor has no idea which investment is best for him and doesn’t understand the terms 
that investment option was described with. 
Self-Sufficient (SS) - profile that scores on knowledge and have low level of uninformed and 
informal advice. Purchaser knows a lot about various investment options and understands 
information about the same. 
Advised Sought (AS) - Research, formal advice and informal advice play important part in 
this type of purchase. Investors consider just familiar providers and products, they are not so 
independent and strong believer in making own decisions. 
Limited Search (LS) - no efforts in any of search factors, this type consider only own 
company as provider of investment products. 
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 Diagram bellow illustrates four investment behavioural profiles: 
 
Figure 4.1: Characterisation of RIS purchase process(Chater et al. 2010) 
Regarding the results it seems that the most frequently observed purchase process is Confused 
Mainstream process (34%), the next most common is Advise Sought by 27% of all retail 
investment purchasers. Relatively few follow the Limited Search process. These numbers tell 
us a lot about typical of the average purchaser indicating his characteristics as non-financial 
educated, unsecure, non-systematic, and somewhat informed. This type of investor most 
likely is advised by friends and family and applies heuristics in making the decisions. One 
more very intuitive fact is that Self Sufficient profile holds the widest range of investment 
products and tends to make more risky investments compare with other types. Although all 
groups showed risk aversion while LM and CM are least comfortable of taking the financial 
risk.(Chater et al. 2010) 
As we could see every single profile described above reflects different way of making 
investment decision and as a consequence SS and AS are much more satisfy with their choice 
of investment option while other two groups usually regret about the selected option. 
If we look at the demographic structure of the profiles exposed above, we will find out more 
about characteristics of each of the behavioural investment types. Based on EU research and 
data collected by this study Self-Sufficient purchasers are mostly male, self-employed, they 
usually have their own company and have some experience working in financial services 
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 industry. Advice Sought investors are a bit younger and most of them are employed full time. 
Self-Sufficient and Advice-Sought purchasers belong to group of higher educated people 
whose education was devoted to economics and mathematics more than other types of 
investors. LM purchasers are the least likely well educated and have very low score on tests 
related to financial and numerical skills. 
 
Figure 4.2: – Size of RIS purchase process segments ,EU average (Chater et al. 2010) 
4.2. Marketing of retail investment products 
There are several channels where retail investment products might be advertised. The most 
popular ones are websites, news, magazines and brochures .Presentation of these products 
(e.g. funds, bonds, insurance, structured products) is usually different among providers. 
Financial institutions advertise their products and attract the consumers with the wide range of 
attributes. The most common information in description of one retail investment product are: 
Risk (e.g. volatility of returns, risk to capital); Return (e.g. maximum return, capital 
guarantee); Investment (e.g. duration, minimum investment amount); Tax, Costs (e.g. set up 
fees, management fees); Reference point (e.g. past performance, competitor products); 
Provider attributes (e.g. expertise, efficiency, low cost) and Reasons for investments (e.g. 
income, tax efficiency, growth).(Chater et al. 2010) 
Marketing examples collected and observed from eight European countries show that the 
most dominant category of information was Reason for Investment (91%) and Provider 
attributes (71%).The least mentioned information were Costs and Tax.(Chater et al. 
2010).That just confirms lack of transparency and intention of providers to attract potential 
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 investors by pointing the positive aspects and goals but hiding and ignoring the costs of the 
products. 
The best way to talk about marketing aspect of retail investment services might be using the 
real examples, so have a look on next ones: 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Example RIS web advertisement(Chater et al. 2010) 
This web-advertisement of investment fund gives us comfort and assure that it is simple to 
handle (“easy to swallow”).The purpose of investing is clearly declared as “Saving for the 
future” while real costs are not specified even fees are mentioned (“SAVE 5% on up front 
charges).Imposing the expertise as “some of the world’s best investment managers “provider 
sent a message of security, certainty and quality of product. The advertisement applies 
framing strategies where up-front fees are disclosed in percentages compared with the 
previous higher level and not in absolute terms. Advert employs anchoring by suggesting the 
possible investment amount ($7200). (Chater et al. 2010) 
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Figure 4.4: Example RIS product description(Chater et al. 2010) 
Another example is found in website of the bank in UK, showing the description of two 
structured products. In both cases the main message sent to potential purchasers is principal 
protection (“peace of mind “, “your money back”) which by definition of structured product 
should be assumed. “Guaranteed growth” as reason for investment shown as minimum return 
of 10% after 5 year fixed term targets the risk aversive group. Providers are well aware of 
framing effects therefore compounded return seems much more attractive than annual 
effective return under 2% that could barely keep the pace with the inflation. Second product 
has also compounded returns (28% at the end in 5 years) but now it is stressed higher 
potential return as a fixed return and later conditional on FTSE 100 share index (no 
information about historical performance of the index).(Chater et al. 2010) 
Many financial instruments and especially structured products are considered in Norway as 
complex and hard to understand. I couldn’t find strong evidence of misleading messages in 
marketing of investments products in Norway, but  more frequent appeals stream in that 
direction. 
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 4.3. Pension fund choices 
People deal with complex decisions as pension fund choices in different ways. They are 
influenced in a number of ways that often result in making sub-optimal decisions. Pension 
plan designers play big role and should have huge responsibility in retirement adequacy.  
Some empirical findings from other countries can serve as a potential lecture on that ground, 
so I will mention some of the systems since Norway lacks on evidences that could provide 
reliable insights. 
Based on UK qualitative research on investment decisions, level of risk, fees and fund size 
were mainly considered by financial sophisticated investor while those with lower financial 
sophistication found advisors as main support even though understanding of financial 
products remained poor. Results from researches on pension plans in US show that 
participants with more investment choices invest more likely in stocks. Also as I already 
mentioned information overload have impact on active choice but also on asset allocation 
therefore as number of investment funds increase the lower risk assets become more popular 
in investors’ portfolio. Overall, members of mandatory individual account pension schemes 
display preference for equities. This may result from factors such as framing effects, the use 
of ‘rules of thumb’ or the professional advice that consumers receive. While general results 
from international surveys reveal preferences towards equity fund, in UK there is tendency 
towards property as a long term investment. Equity allocations are particularly observed with 
the higher earners and married participants. Dutch household survey found that respondents 
with low financial literacy were significantly less likely to invest in equities. Recent analyses 
of 401(k) administrative data match with the survey from Sweden where is found positive 
relationship between income and level of risk – risky assets held by higher income investors. 
Evidence from the US tells us that equity exposure is lowest for participants over 65 and 
highest for the age group between 25 and 54.(Collard 2009) 
An Analysis of OECD Panel Data was conducted to test the understanding of asset allocation 
in retirement plans in six developed countries. Determination of retirement asset portfolio is 
greatly impacted by life expectancy and household net saving rate. Clearly, longer life 
expectancy requests more sufficient accumulation assets. Finally results indicate high 
concentration of equities (stocks, mutual funds) in US, Germany as only country where 
percentage of equities in portfolio has not decreased despite global financial crisis, Denmark 
and Czech Republic had bills and bonds as dominate in retirement assets and Korea with cash 
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 and deposits. This study is interesting because it indicates necessity of rebalance of retirement 
assets as the result of the impact of external factors and market movements. That means US 
may consider rebalance since huge recessionary stock market impact in order to increase 
securities of retirees. Also those with low yield fund should consider in good economic time 
gradually rebalance the funds for the long term investment with higher returns. (Choi et al. 
2012)With all mentioned above, it is clear that there is no simple and unique answer on asset 
allocation, but solution exists, as for the policy makers and investors as well. 
 
Figure 4.5: Government pension fund Norway-Total assets (Statistics Norway 2012) 
Structure of total assets of pension fund Norway definitely shows the biggest share of 
equities. Shares and other equity were valued at a total of NOK 90,4 billion at the end of the 
2012 that is increase of 10% from the end of the June. The value of bond portfolio increased 
by 3,6%  and amounts to NOK 53,3 billion while deposits and other financial assets worth 
respectively NOK 8,8 billion and NOK2,5 billion. (Statistics Norway 2012) 
Participants of the several surveys on investments for retirement didn’t express confidence in 
adequacy of pension savings. They usually have no idea if their savings will provide an 
adequate income in retirement. Seven US firms analysed their employees contributions and 
found out that 20-60% of them didn’t match threshold that provides employers contribution, 
therefore giving up of free significant financial incentive. Results of the research also showed 
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 that great impact among members with contribution bellow threshold had low financial 
literacy and procrastinate.(Tapia & Yermo 2007) 
Why I’m emphasising the asset allocation and contribution rate here? Basically, how much 
and where to invest are crucial decisions and that will define adequacy of future retirement 
income. Pension plan design plays big role in investor’s choice. If the green market dominates 
with the apples your fruit salad will most likely have the highest proportion of apples. That 
put the highest responsibility on policy makers, employees and financial institutions in order 
to create understandable and efficient investment menu.  
4.4. Policy intervention 
4.4.1. Financial transparency 
From policy perspective it is crucial to identify factors influencing investor’s making 
decision. Once it is established why most likely poor decision was made, measures should be 
applied. If it is found that majority made bad investment decision because of cognitive 
limitations policy makers should consider two approaches, either to improve transparency of 
operating in retail investment market or to equip the investor with the knowledge necessary to 
make sound decisions.(Chater et al. 2010) 
Transparency will be achieved when information between two dissimilar options are 
comparable and when you are able to extract important information out of complex 
investment description. Pre-calculation, simplification and standardization might be solution 
for that kind of issue. Disclosure of the most relevant information in standardized format will 
make it easier to understand structure of investment products. Many European countries use 
Key Investor Information (KII) Document to provide pre-calculated and comparable data 
about investments and in that way to improve quality of decision making.(Chater et al. 2010) 
The regulation of this aspect of the retail investment market would have to be mandatory. 
Providing this sort of documents would make potential investor much more comfortable to 
invest. 
4.4.2. Financial education  
As noted earlier we could simplify making decision by providing pre-calculated, standardised 
and pertinent comparable information or try to serve financial knowledge crucial for selecting 
optimal investment choice. Explanation of some of the economic terms used in investment 
description might be of huge help for individual. That can be for instance definition of annual 
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 return- increase or decrease in your investment per year. If you invest NOK 5000 and get  
NOK 5500 back each year your annual return is NOK 500 or 10%. Or Gross return: The 
increase or decrease in the amount held in your investment, before any fees and taxes are 
deducted(Chater et al. 2010).In same way terms as nominal and effective interest rate, 
indexation ,stocks, bonds, mutual funds, compounding, fixed gross return, cash deposit and 
many other used finance phrase have to be understandable. 
Another way to financial educate retail investors is giving advices that is guide to the best 
decision. Even we assume that one can understand finance terminology, lack of proficiency 
and experience might be huge obstacle. Look at the some of the advice examples: 
• For the investments with the variable rate of return it is difficult to estimate what is 
the best in short term, but for the long term, historical average rate might be 
approximate for such investments (e.g. stocks,shares) 
• If the annual return is 10% your final amount after 5 years will be calculated as                     
NOK 10 000 at an annual rate of 10% = NOK 10 000 * 110% * 110% * 110% * 
110% * 110% = NOK 16105 after 5 years but if the rate of return is paid after 5 years 
than NOK 10 000 at a rate of 10% is NOK 10 000 * 110% = NOK 11 000 
• Set up fees are charged at the start of the investment period but annual fees are 
applied to the total investment amount (include return) at the end of the each year of 
investment period (Chater et al. 2010) 
4.4.3. De-biasing 
All behavioural biases described earlier lead to irrational behaviour and only prevention is to 
increase awareness of the same. In that way investor can mitigate or avoid bias and raise the 
quality of decision making. Even financial literate and cognitively capable investors make 
errors just because they are also vulnerable to behavioural biases. If they are introduced with 
possible and most common mistakes that biased investor usually makes, there is a chance the 
investor reconsider intuition and come up with the optimal investment decision. 
 We can apply ‘de-biasing’ on results from my experiment where I observed that people are 
highly sensitive towards losses. In this case, de-biasing information is supposed to shed a light 
on tendency of people to be biased toward investment option without initial fees (seen as a 
loss) regardless of overall return. People should be told that an investment with higher start-up 
fee may have lower annual fee which in long term more than makes up for initial fee, as we 
will see in my experimental design. Also responders tend to be highly risk averse in my 
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 survey therefore that might be sign for resistance towards riskier investments. That means 
they should be informed that even though returns on risky investments might change too 
often, in long term they should be concerned just with the average return of risky investment 
that is often higher than the one with fixed return and capital guarantee. 
4.4.4. Choice architecture  
Choice architects play very important part when it comes to pension plan designs, since their 
power to shape investors opinion is tremendous therefore their responsibility is huge. As I 
already mentioned, automatic enrolment is very popular and efficient in many countries. 
Participation rate increases since people join the plan sooner they would have otherwise. 
Instead of making very complex decisions, how much to invest, how to allocate investments, 
one can be automatically enrolled unless he asks to opt out. If they choose latter option they 
will need to make an active decision among the funds offered in the plan. 
In the beginning of the implementation of define contribution scheme default option didn’t 
exist. Adopting the automatic enrolment, default option has been imposed as necessary since 
participants needed to be enrolled into some specific asset portfolio. Traditionally it was quite 
conservative option since employers could be sued if the default participant goes into more 
risky direction. Later default options developed into something that can be good example for 
current employers. Namely, plan sponsors may offer conservative, moderate and aggressive 
‘’lifestyle’ portfolios and all participants need to do is to select their portfolio depends on risk 
preferences. ’Target maturity funds’ might also be effective possible solution, in this case 
participant is supposed to choose the fund that fits their retirement date.(Thaler & Sunstein 
2008) 
People showed inertia with the reconstruction of their portfolio and contribution rate as well. 
Plan members usually got stuck with initial asset allocation and contribution rate all their 
pension arrangements period. ’Save more for tomorrow’ is program where people accept to 
increase contribution rate in line with the raise of the salary. In that way participants who 
were unwilling in the first place to accept higher contribution in future, ended up with even 
higher rate with this program.(Thaler & Sunstein 2008) 
I found that experience from other countries could be good indicator how programs 
mentioned above work in reality and with that said government incentives and wisely pre-
default organised pension plan could significantly help potential investors. 
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 5. METHOD; DATA 
 
5.1. Data collection 
The research analysis in my thesis is based on data collected by web survey. TNS Gallup has 
conducted data collection on the behalf of the National Institute for Consumer Research of 
Children, Equality and Social Inclusion (SIFO). Gallup Panel is pre-recruited sample of 
people over 15 years of age who are willing to participate surveys (currently around 
45,000).The panel size indicates that it is possible to extract representative sample. Web based 
design provides great flexibility in the design of questionnaire allowing graphic illustration, 
filter options etc. Electronic communication allows fast implementation at a low cost 
therefore this method can be considered as very effective method, both in terms of sample 
quality and collection costs6. The survey was sent out as an e-mail invitation to participate, 
along with the link to the questionnaire address on the Internet. 
A common issue for web-based survey is selection and sampling biases. The sampling bias, 
caused by the on-line population differing from the general population, might reduce 
representativeness of the results. Since in Norway internet penetration is very high (93% 
internet penetration in age group 15-80 years in 2012)7 we can consider sampling bias 
insignificant.  
Data collection was conducted in February-March 2013. Number of respondents is 73% of 
those who opened the survey which comes to 1823 respondents in total. Even though financial 
saving is matter of all working activate people including the youngest ones with their early 
stage of working life, respondents will be in range of 40-65 years old regardless of 
employment. It is assumed that this group is more relevant when it is about attitude to 
financial savings considering their working experience and not many years of working life 
left. 
  
6 http://wybowiersma.net/pub/essays/Wiersma,Wybo,The_validity_of_surveys_online_and_offline.pdf 
7 http://www.mvfglobal.com/scandinavia 
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 5.2. Experimental design 
5.2.1. Experiment 1-Choice of saving products 
This experiment plays central role of the survey. Responder’s answers should reflect how they 
think in process of making decisions and what drives them to select particular choice. They 
are supposed to choose between three saving products that have the same risk profile but 
different composition of the fee structure. Each of the saving products has different start-up 
fee, an annual fee in absolute amount and annual fee as a percentage of the amount paid. 
Table 5.1: Fee structure of investment alternatives 
Fee type Fee Level 
← Lowest level                                                                 Highest 
  One-time fee in NOK 0 1250 2500 3750 5 000 
Annual fee in NOK 0 250 500 750 1 000 
Annual percentage fee 0 0,5 1 1,5 2 
 
The group of 75 saving alternatives will make up 25 different choice sets. Each of the 
respondents will randomly be assigned with three choice sets where they are supposed to 
choose the highest and lowest profitable option. The choice sets consist of three different 
investment saving products as the text and example below shows: 
Suppose you plan to save ten thousand NOK per year for the next ten years. You can choose 
between three saving products, which are identical except for the size of the set-up fee and the 
annual fees. The annual fees are either fixed and/or percentage and deducted from the 
balance amount at the end of the each year. We assume that there is no inflation in the period 
and the annual return is 5% before fees. 
Your task is to rate saving products A, B and C based on what you think would be the most 
and least profitable savings product for you. 
Saving 10 000 per year for 10 years in a saving product with 5% return before fees. 
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 Q 4a. Which of the three savings products do you think are the most and the least profitable? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Screenshot of Experiment 1 
 
5.2.2. Experiment 2: Purchase of insurance against losses 
As the text of this experiment says, many saving products have uncertain return and investor 
may lose all or part of the invested money. Risk is very important factor of savings therefore 
many financial institutions offer an insurance against loss. The purpose of the experiment is to 
test willingness to pay for such insurance and whether it matters if the insurance is presented 
in absolute amount or percentage. That means the aim of the experiment is twofold, analysis 
of risk aversion and effects of framing. 
Let's assume you have a hundred thousand NOK that you should spend on a saving product 
that has a ten year binding term. The saving product has an uncertain return. There is a third 
of a chance that it shrinks by 3% per year, one-third chance that it grows by 5%  per year and 
one-third chance that it grows by 13%  per year. Over a decade, this will make a big 
difference. 
If the amount shrink by 3% per year, this will result in parts of the deposit is lost. 
The Bank offers insurance against losses that ensures that you still have at least a hundred 
thousand NOK in saving product after 10 years. The insurance premium is deducted annually 
from the amount deposited. The policy entails avoiding losses if the market goes down, but 
that you get a little lower return if the market goes up than if you did not have insurance. 
Type of fee Saving product 
A B C 
One-time fee in NOK 0 5 000 2 500 
Annual fee in NOK 0 750 500 
Annual percentage fee 2 0 1 
Your rank  
Most profitable 
   
Least profitable 
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 Q.5a. Do you want to buy such insurance, and what are the highest annual premiums you 
would pay? 
Price per year on 
insurance against losses 
 Would not buy insurance Would buy insurance 
500 kr   
750 kr   
1 000 kr   
1 250 kr   
1 500 kr   
1 750 kr   
2 000 kr   
2 250 kr   
2 500 kr   
2 750 kr   
3 000 kr   
Figure 5.2:Screenshot of Experiment 2 , Kr-framing 
Since half of the respondents did experiment in NOK-framing and other half in percentage-
framing, we are applying “between subject design” in this analysis. The text of the experiment 
stays the same. 
Price per year on 
insurance against losses. 
The price is % of the 
deposited 100 000 NOK 
 Would not buy insurance Would buy insurance 
0,50 %   
0,75 %   
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 1,00 %   
1,25 %   
1,50 %   
1,75 %   
2,00 %   
2,25 %   
2,50 %   
2,75 %   
3,00 %   
Figure 5.3: Screenshot of Experiment 2 , %-framing 
5.2.3. Experiment 3: Risk preferences 
Compared with the previous one, this experiment will measure risk preferences in situation of 
potential gains. The respondent is supposed to choose between safe monetary outcome or 
gamble with two monetary outcomes with different probabilities. Each of the responders will 
make 10 choices. This version of experiment is modelled by experiment in Masatlioglu et al. 
(2012). 
 
 
Choice between sure or uncertain return 
 
You should take 10 choices. In each of these 10 choices you will make a choice between 
option 1 and 2 
 
You will make 10 choices between sure pay- out of NOK 2500 and the lottery where the pay-
out will be NOK 1500 or NOK 3500. The probability for NOK 1500 pay-out and 3500 NOK 
pay-out varies between ten choices. 
 
40 
 
 Situation 
nr. 
Alternativ 1 Alternativ 2 Your choice 
1 
10 % probability 3 500 kr 
90 % probability 1 500 kr 
Sure 2 500 kr ○ 1          ○ 2 
2 
20 % probability 3 500 kr 
80 % probability 1 500 kr 
Sure 2 500 kr ○ 1          ○ 2 
3 
30 % probability 3 500 kr 
70 % probability 1 500 kr 
Sure 2 500 kr ○ 1          ○ 2 
4 
40 % probability 3 500 kr 
60 % probability 1 500 kr 
Sure 2 500 kr ○ 1          ○ 2 
5 
50 % probability 3 500 kr 
50 % probability 1 500 kr 
Sure 2 500 kr ○ 1          ○ 2 
6 
60 % probability 3 500 kr 
40 % probability 1 500 kr 
Sure 2 500 kr ○ 1          ○ 2 
7 
70 % probability 3 500 kr 
30 % probability 1 500 kr 
Sure 2 500 kr ○ 1          ○ 2 
8 
80 % probability 3 500 kr 
20 % probability 1 500 kr 
Sure 2 500 kr ○ 1          ○ 2 
9 
90 % probability 3 500 kr 
10 % probability 1 500 kr 
Sure 2 500 kr ○ 1          ○ 2 
10 Sure 3 500 kr Sure 2 500 kr ○ 1          ○ 2 
Figure 5.4: Screenshot of experiment on risk preferences 
Selected options by respondents should reflect their attitude to risk in situation with 
hypothetically monetary outcomes. In order to prevent misinterpretation of the results and to 
get reliable results some respondents were excluded. The respondent who has more than one 
break-even point (those who switched between the options more than once), and the 
respondents with selected option “2” in last choice set (who prefers 2500 NOK over 3500 
NOK),had problems with understanding the experiment therefore have not been considered in 
representative sample. By this selection final sample in this experiment consists of 1387 
respondents representing the 76% of the main sample. 
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 5.2.4. Questionnaire 
Questions addressed to respondents have two main goals. One group of questions was created 
in order to gather socio-demographic information about individuals, and second group was 
related to their attitude, knowledge and potential to understand savings for retirement. Since 
one of the goals of my research is to identify the vulnerable categories of respondents in the 
sample, background information will serve on that purpose. Whether they are well informed 
about pension savings, what are their expectations and do they have adequate skills to 
understand saving products will be matter of additional questions in this part of the survey. 
Socio-demographic variables of interested area are: 
- Age 
- Gender 
- Number of children in household 
- Marital status 
- Household income and personal income 
- Education level 
- Municipality, location 
- The main source of livelihood 
- Industry working experience 
- Sector (private or public) 
-Occupation 
-Main bank; Main insurance company 
 
Self-reported questions related to saving products: 
- How little or much knowledge do you have about savings products? 
- How bad or good overview do you have over your rights for pensions savings? 
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 - How bad or good overview do you have of your pensions from the government?  
- How good or bad overview do you have of your pensions from other sources? 
- How do you imagine your life as a pensioner? 
- In witch degree are mathematics, economics, and/or statistics part of your education? 
- Comment the statement: "The financial industry is in general good to inform about the 
products' costs/products' risk?" 
- Comment the statement: "The information from the advisors in my bank is trustworthy" 
- Comment the statement:"My bank is good to inform about the products' costs/products' risk"  
-Do you possess life insurance/bonds/stocks/funds/structural products/individual pension’s 
savings? 
- When do you plan to retire? 
- How big share of your pension will come from the government? 
- Have you experienced a situation where you were not able to pay bills or debt at maturity? 
- How often have these payment problems happened? 
- What is 4% of 50? 
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 6. ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH RESULTS 
 
The lesson of my analysis is supposed to shed a light on capability of responders to make 
optimal investment decision, familiarity with the pension arrangements and their risk attitude. 
What are the main obstacles in process of selecting the right investment alternative, who is 
the most vulnerable and prone making the mistakes and how they understand the saving 
products in general are the goals of this study. In order to get the answers I will apply 
descriptive statistics and regression analysis on data obtained from the experiment already 
described. Analysis will be broken down to the three sections respect to the each of the 
experiments. Questionnaire will serve as base for findings whether people are aware of 
importance of investment decisions and understanding the same, experiment 1 will guide us to 
the potential and most frequent mistakes in choice of saving products and experiment 2 and 3 
will disclose risk preferences and possible framing effects. 
6.1. Pension comprehension 
6.1.1. Pension savings adequacy 
Time when risk for retirement savings from employers to employees will be shifted is 
coming. Where to invest, how much to contribute, when to retire, and many other decisions 
will effect optimal pensions. First of all institutions need to earn the trust because everything 
starts with the source of information and understanding of different pension arrangements.  
Where the responders stand when it is about their saving portfolio and ages of retirement will 
be just introduction for further investigation. Figure 6.1 shows the most common used saving 
products of the responders from the sample: 
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Figure 6.1: Private saving portfolio in percentages; N=1798 
The first thing that stands out of this Figure is the greatest share of high rent saving account 
and the lowest share of structural products. I assume that the results of high saving account 
are primarily rooted in easiness of understanding and investing. It is very transparent and not 
time consuming way of saving. On the other side the lowest percentage of structural products 
again show how important the complexity of the product can be. One of the crucial elements 
in deciding the right investment choice is risk attitude. The irony of the results is that 
structural product is created to facilitate risk return objectives but the difficulties of the 
understanding keep them out of traditional retail investment portfolio. In other words, high 
saving accounts that might go up with the annual interests around 4% prevailed the structural 
products that in year with no radical fluctuation rise over 10%8. Basically structured products 
main purpose is protection principal from the loss giving the opportunity to earn high interest 
at the same time. That is feasible because of the structure of this product where one 
component (traditional security) provide the deposit back regardless of the market risk and 
other component as underlying asset gives the opportunity of achieving very attractive interest 
rates9. Since my findings regarding risk preferences (next point of discussion) show risk 
aversion among respondents, than significant differences between stocks and structural 
products could be explained just over the lack of capacity for understanding the complex 
saving products. 
8 https://www.dnb.no/en/personal/savings-and-investments/investment-products/investment-account.html 
9 http://www.investopedia.com/articles/pf/07/good_investment.asp 
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 My further analysis hasn’t showed significant differences in education and gender with 
holding the different saving products even the graphs confirmed the trend from the previous 
studies. Previous researches indicated that highly educated, especially with greater numerical 
skills and men are holding the more risky assets(Banks & Oldfield 2004).  
The interesting results might be regarding income of individuals and investment portfolio        
(Figure 6.2 ) 
 
Figure 6.2: Private saving portfolio wrt. Personal income(High saving account; Stocks)                                            
T-test; Significant differences at the 5% -level.(t=2,93,p=0.0035) 
My findings that higher income individuals allocate a greater share of savings to stocks 
(equities) might be interpreted in different ways. It is possible that wealthier individuals are 
less risk averse than lower income individuals. Second guess would include education since 
lower educated most likely are lower income individuals, those who make the optimization 
error by holding too large share of their portfolio in fixed-income assets.(high saving account-
34% among individuals under NOK 200.000). 
The second point that affects optimality of retirement income and that is of huge matter for 
policy makers refers to ages of retirement. In order to maintain the sustainable pension model 
government tends to keep active workers as long as possible. The shorter one stay in 
workforce, the longer retirement will be and more money will be necessary to fund it. That 
means those ones who decide for early retirement might reconsider their financial planning 
and maybe applies more aggressive approach to investing. 
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Figure 6.3: Planned retirement ages in percentages; N=1798 
We could interpret the graph as a warning for the great percentage of the individuals who plan 
to retire before 67 years of ages and especially concern grows with the proportion of those in 
group 60-63 (around 28%). 
The questions above, related to the optimal saving for retirement, are subject of much deeper 
analysis and extent. The issue that is even more important is whether individuals make fully 
informed decisions and what is the level of understanding the saving products.That is the 
subject of next discussion. 
 
6.1.2. Confidence in financial institutions and own retirement security 
Looking at the Figure 6.4 and 6.5 we can see how different socioeconomic groups are 
confident with their knowledge over pension rights and saving products. Self –rated answers 
will serve to find out whether they are comfortable with the knowledge they have about 
pension’s related issues. 
3.69 
27.85 
18.46 
24.78 
4.36 2.18 
18.68 
before 60 60-63 64-66 67 68-70 70+ dont know
When do you plan to retire? 
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Figure 6.4: Overview of pensions distributed by ages. Average value scale from 1-7 where 1-very poor overview 
and 7-very good overview 
 
Figure 6.5: Overview of pensions distributed by education. Average value scale from 1-7 where 1-very poor 
overview and 7-very good overview 
Population approaching the ages of retirement showed greater awareness over pension rights 
and reasonably more interests for this topic than younger population (Figure 6.4). That is not 
indicator of higher capacity to understand but getting more into pensions problematic closing 
the ages of retirement. Also with the line of my expectation, higher educated individuals 
showed more confidence about their pension knowledge (Figure 6.5). 
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 Do wealthier individuals have better knowledge about saving products? Some logic and 
results from Figure 6.6 might lead us to unequivocal answer but we should consider and be 
cautious about causality in this case. 
 
Figure 6.6: Knowledge about saving products wrt.  personal income. Average value scale from 1-7 where 1-very 
poor overview and 7-very good overview 
Better knowledge about saving products definitely can bring up the individual’s wealth, but 
also direction of causality could run in reverse direction- wealthier people could afford to hold 
in large and more complex types of assets and in that way to learn and  increase the financial 
knowledge. 
It might be weakness of previous questions that is too broad and could be difficult to get real 
picture of their knowledge (e.g. more concrete could be, will pension go up more than prices 
or how much one can expect to get in retirement?) 
The banking sector and financial services industry in general have gotten negative publicity in 
the recent years. The latest news regarding the case of the Norway’s biggest bank DNB and 
disillusioned savers finally got the last word on the Supreme Court. Namely, one individual’s 
complain of being misled by financial advisor with the loan financed investment products 
extended on more than 1500 customers claims. It turns out that the sold products contained 
errors and risk was not transparent. Now the bank faces the possibility of paying out several 
hundred million kroner worth of compensations for those who bought the same product and 
formally complained.(Supreme Court ruling encourages disillusioned savers  2013) 
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 Increasing number of unsatisfied retail investors was the reason to investigate how responders 
estimate bank sector and financial industry in general as suppliers of necessary information. 
 
Figure 6.7: The quality of information provided by bank and financial industry wrt education. Average value on 
scale of 1-7, where 1 = very poor and 7 = very good 
As we could see from Figure 6.7 people are not so confident in financial industry as source of 
reliable information. More confidence they expressed with the banks and particularly in case 
with bank advisors that might be sign of the important effect of interpersonal communication 
between investor and bank’s official. We saw also trend where higher educated responders 
have lower confidence that in some way tells that they are more updated with the potential 
threats and financial traps than less educated group. 
Figure 6.8 discloses one more potential vulnerable group. As matter of fact, it turns out 
female are more confident and have higher trust in financial industry and banks, while male 
are more cautious and might be possible more comfortable with their own assessment. 
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Figure 6.8: The quality of information provided by bank and financial industry wrt gender. Average value on 
scale of 1-7, where 1 = very poor and 7 = very good 
It is interesting to analyse the answers on one of the questions from the survey related to 
individual’s expectations in the future that in some way actually reflects their understanding 
of saving products. Specifically the question is how they see themselves as pensioners, if they 
expect good, bad economy or they don’t know. Significant majority (38,6%) of the responders 
didn’t know what to expect in future expressing great financial insecurity and lack of financial 
knowledge. 
The 2nd and 4th columns in Table 6.1 report the results of a probit regression analysis 
indicating the impact of several factors on individual’s financial insecurity. More precisely, 
dependent variable takes value 0 if they are sure about expectations in retirement and 1 if they 
can’t predict about their wealth state in future. The latter state is quite alarming because 
uncertainty is most likely result of bad financial planning that eventually might bring 
suboptimal retirement resources. As we can see with the increase of responder’s ages 
predicted probability of financial insecurity decrease. The same is with the education which is 
in line with my expectations therefore more educated people and people with more 
experience, closer to the retirement, expressed more security and awareness of their future 
wealth state. That is another sign for policy makers to apply efficient tools in order to raise 
awareness for younger population about importance of saving products and to help less 
educated to cope with current financial innovations. 
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 Table 6.1: Financial insecurity and socio-economic factors 
Fin.insecurity Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
personal income .0070105 .0240283 0.29 0.770 -.0400841 .0541052 
education -.0529665 .0300479 -1.76 0.078 -.1118593 .0059262 
Ages -.0094276 .0043771 -2.15 0.031 -.0180066 -.0008486 
Gender -.0059167 .0655577 -0.09 0.928 -.1344074 .1225739 
_cons .3318185 .2853865 1.16 0.245 -.2275288 .8911658 
Note: Probit analysis, Number of obs=1639 
 
As I can see results from my sample pictured average Norwegian as quite conservative and 
restrained. He chooses saving account as common financial instrument and still hesitates to 
experiment with the more complex product even it might promise better return. Some trends 
showed that higher educated and wealthier population is more comfortable with the riskier 
assets and their portfolio is most likely more diversified than less educated and those with the 
lower income. Almost 50% of the sample would like to retire before 67 years old which is not 
in a line with government tendency considering longer life expectation and larger share of 
retirees than active workers. 
Responders seem to have less confidence in financial industry in general as reliable source of 
necessary information, but still they consider their knowledge about saving products above 
average. This should be taken with the reserve since self-reported answers could be result of 
overconfidence therefore not accurate indicator. Higher educated individuals expressed 
cautious and not remarkable level of trust in institutions while wealthier people believe in 
their knowledge about saving products. People are still insecure about future retirement 
income, 38,6% are not sure what to expect and it seems majority belongs to younger 
population(in our sample closer to 40 years old). 
6.2.  Attitudes to investment risk 
6.2.1. Risk as important on different levels  
Before analysing the risk preferences among responders from the survey I would like to shed 
some light on risk as important factor in decision making process. I already mentioned several 
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 times and shortly discus asset allocation and importance of portfolio therefore risk as the 
factor that shape potential funds in one’s saving package. But we should bear in mind that risk 
doesn’t represent just market risk, might be superficial view especially when we talk about 
retirement savings. Table 6.2 below will clear my point out: 
Table 6.2: The Risk Trade-Offs in the Retirement-Savings Problem 
Type of risk 'Safer assets'' 
'Riskier 
assets'' 
Market Cash Equities 
Saving Shortfall Equities Cash 
Longevity Equities Cash 
Inflation 
Equities,Inflation-protected 
Securities Cash,Bonds 
Source:(Fontaine 2005) 
As we could see, considering short-term market risk, equities don’t look like as the smartest 
solution, but represent far less longevity or inflation risk which is more important in case of 
retirement saving goals. With cash investments individual is not concerned with short market 
risk but all other types of risk significantly increases. Importance of each of the risk type is 
relative and changes over participant’s life span. It is so crucial for design fund’s plan that for 
instance working years are followed by risk of not contributing enough or too conservatively, 
in retirement is longevity(risk of outliving your savings) and inflation risk( saving will lose 
purchase power).Young savers should be more aggressive seeking for higher returns since 
their contribution is not considerable, also midlife savers could follow that strategy 
considering the great results from the potential compounding returns on already significant 
savings, while retirees should seek to cut the chances of capital loss.(Fontaine 2005) 
Back to my experimental design, specifically experiment 2 and 3 (5.2.2 and 5.2.3.), my 
intention was to investigate attitude towards investment risk in both situations when investor 
faces the loss and gain and to test for the framing effects. 
6.2.2. Risk insurance 
Equity investments are exposed to market risk including possibility of loss principal. Bonds 
are influenced by interest rate so when interest rates rise, the price of bonds can decrease and 
even lose principal value. An investment in money market fund is not insured by some of the 
government agency. Many long term investments have the risk of losing the initial deposited 
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 amount but numerous analyses showed that individuals were not even aware of this fact 
implying poor financial knowledge10. In description of experiment 2 possibility of 
losing some of the initial investment is transparent therefore I want to test their willingness to 
protect themselves from such a risk.(Figure 6.9 and 6.10) 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Willingness to pay for the insurance against loss by percentage framing. N=921. 
  
Figure 6.10: Willingness to pay for insurance against loss by kr- framing. N=899. 
10 http://www.axa-equitable.com/retirement/how-much-do-you-need-to-retire.html 
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 Both graphs show the willingness to pay insurance against potential loss in two frames, 
percentage and absolute values. The most frequent answers in both cases were ‘don’t wish to 
buy’ and ‘don’t know’. 
 The greatest share of those two groups indicates resistance and confusion towards uncertain 
events, in this case potential loss. Uncertain return could make responders undetermined but 
also overoptimistic since beside one third of chance of losing some deposit (3% loss per year), 
there are also equal chances for market to go up by 5% and 13%.In latter case people might 
count on positive market movements ignoring the possibility to secure their initial amount in 
case of bad scenario. 
 
Figure 6.11:Framing effects-willingness to pay for the insurance in kr vs % frame. T-test. Significant differences 
at the 5% level(t=2,701) 
If we analyse both insurance price in NOK and % (Figure 6.11), there is no significant 
difference between percentage and absolute value price among those who don’t want to pay 
but still greater proportion is on side of percentage framework group.  
There is significant difference between responders who didn’t know how much they would 
pay for the insurance. The group that got percentage framework expressed greater confusion. 
The possible answer on such outcome is that people have difficulties with the percentages and 
hardly deal with this shape of price. It is possible that beside essential doubts of paying the 
insurance, transferring the percentages into real value just make their decision even harder to 
make.  
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
40.00
45.00
50.00
don't
wish
to buy
250 or
0,25
500 or
0,50
750 or
0,75
1000
or
1,00
1250
or
1,25
1500
or
1,50
1750
or
1,75
2000
or
2,00
2250
or
2,25
2500
or
2,50
2750
or
2,75
3000
or
3,00
don't
know
Framig effect 
insurance( kr)
insurance(%)
55 
 
 Complete answer on why people behave as risk seekers in this situation, we will get after 
discussing the risk preferences through experiment 3, but for the start let’s explain by 
conventional economics why it is better to pay some of the prices than to be extreme risk 
seeker (Table 6.3). 
Table 6.3 shows expected value of investment during ten year period according different 
premiums (insurance price) and three possible scenarios, loss 3%, gain 5% and 13% 
respectively. As we can see the last column represents expected investment value depends on 
insurance payment in range of 0-NOK 3000 .It’s not hard to notice that paying the insurance 
all the way up to NOK 750, including that price as well, (NOK 771.8 is the price where 
expected values are equal) results in increasing the expected value and reasonably reducing 
the risk. That means those premiums are under-priced and one who would choose some of 
these prices would be better off than not paying at all. Despite that fact, around 40% of people 
reported not to pay for the insurance. One of the reasons might come from financial retail 
market where people are overwhelmed by different insurance deals. The customers are 
showered with the wide range of insurance products so they started to lose the trust in this 
kind of financial instrument. 
Table 6.3: The expected investment value after insurance payment  
Premium Loss 3% Gain 5% Gain 13% Expected value 
0 73742.41 162889.5 339456.7 192029.54 
250 100000 159587.8 334253.2 197946.98 
500 100000 156286.1 329049.6 195111.88 
750 100000 152984.4 323846 192276.79 
1000 100000 149682.7 318642.4 189441.70 
1250 100000 146381 313438.8 186606.61 
1500 100000 143079.3 308235.3 183771.52 
1750 100000 139777.6 303031.7 180936.42 
2000 100000 136475.9 297828.1 178101.33 
2500 100000 129872.5 287420.9 172431.15 
3000 100000 123269.1 277013.8 166760.96 
771.8 100000 152696.5 323392.2 192029.57 
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 I keep tracking two groups with the most frequent answers on insurance question in order to 
find out if there is some particular factor affecting the individual not to pay or not to know the 
answer. Two regression analyses will help us to get some conclusions regarding those 
correlations. First probit regression (Table 6.4) will have dependent variable (noins) that takes 
value 0 if they want to pay some amount and value 1 if they don’t wish to pay. Second probit 
regression (Table 6.5) has dependent variable taking the value 0 if they decide to pay any of 
the insurance prices and value 1 if they do not know the answer. 
Table 6.4: Unwillingness to pay for the insurance wrt. socio-economic factors 
noins Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
    personal income .0115321 .026429 0.44 0.663 -.0402679 .063332 
education -.0360525 .0368961 -0.98 0.329 -.1083675 .0362625 
ages .0195312 .004891 3.99 0.000 .0099449 .0291174 
male -.0473618 .0725465 -0.65 0.514 -.1895503 .0948267 
math .1436178 .1256974 1.14 0.253 -.1027444 .3899801 
_cons -1.745901 .2994768 -5.83 0.000 -2.332865 -1.158937 
Note: Probit analysis ,Sample size=1639 
Looking at the significance of the results from Table 6.4, personal income, education, gender 
are not significant at 5% level, while increasing the ages causes increase probability of not 
paying the premium. It seems that older people showed more unwillingness towards insurance 
prices. 
Table 6.5: Undecided about insurance vs. socio-economic factors; Probit analysis, Number of obs=1639 
notknow Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
personal income .0007016 .0288471 0.02 0.981 -.0558377 .0572408 
education -.0947153 .0407182 -2.33 0.020 -.1745215 -.0149091 
ages -.0106189 .0053881 -1.97 0.049 -.0211793 -.0000585 
male -.3097649 .0805802 -3.84 0.000 -.4676992 -.1518306 
Math -.2740474 .1653849 -1.66 0.098 -.598196 .0501011 
_cons -.0518227 .3216345 -0.16 0.872 -.6822146 .5785693 
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 Table 6.5 shows that with increasing education, ages and mathematic skills of the responders, 
probability of not to know the answer decrease therefore higher educated, more numerate and 
older people are surer about their decision and price they would pay for the insurance. The 
same conclusion refers to gender where man are more decisive therefore taking the value 1 of 
dummy variable ‘male’, decrease probability of not knowing the answer. It might be that man 
are more confident and overestimate their own skills giving the less undefined answers. 
6.2.3. Risk preferences 
The purpose of experiment 3 was to test for the risk preferences in situation where one is 
supposed to choose between safe monetary outcome and gamble with different combinations 
of outcomes and probabilities (5.2.3.). 
Indicator for risk preferences is switching point between the choices in ten different 
situations. (Figure 5.4) Classification was modelled on Holt and Laury (2002), but in addition 
I went further and made even more detailed categorisation. There are six risk categorised 
groups: extreme risk seeker (start with 1st choice and end up the same or start 2nd choice and 
switch in situation 2); quite risk seeker (start with 2nd ,switch in situation 3 or 4);low risk 
seeker (switch in situation 5); low risk aversive( switch in situation 6);quite risk 
aversive(switch in situation 7 or 8);extreme risk aversive(switch in situation 9 or 10) 
 
Figure 6.12: Risk preferences derived from experiment 3 (percentages) 
Looking at the Figure 6.12 we can conclude that Norwegians are highly risk averse with close 
to 70% of sample (three risk aversive groups together) showing the safe option as preferable 
up to the situation nr.5 and further. 
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 Table 6.6 will serve to make risk preferences even more understandable.(Follow the Figure 
5.4) 
Table 6.6: Expected monetary outcome vs. sure gain 
Situation nr. Alternative 1 (Expected value) Aletrnative 2 
1 1700 kr Sure 2500 kr 
2 1900 kr Sure 2500 kr 
3 2100 kr Sure 2500 kr 
4 2300 kr Sure 2500 kr 
5 2500 kr Sure 2500 kr 
6 2700 kr Sure 2500 kr 
7 2900 kr Sure 2500 kr 
8 3100 kr Sure 2500 kr 
9 3300 kr Sure 2500 kr 
10 3500 kr Sure 2500 kr 
Note: Derived from experiment 3(attitude towards risk) 
As we can see from the table, situation nr.5 results in equal monetary outcome. I assumed that 
is a break-even point, and one who chooses sure outcome in that case have been categorised 
as risk averse ( specifically low risk averse) and taking the monetary gamble over sure 
outcome as risk seeker (low risk seeker). 
Following the logic above, I considered answers in situation nr.5 as indicators of riskiness and 
dependent variable in probit analysis. It will take value 0 if responder shows risk seeking 
behaviour (alternative 1) and value 1 if one shows as risk averse (alternative 2).  
Table 6.7: Risk preferences wrt. socio-economic factors 
riskiness Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
personal income -.0356079 .0261524 -1.36 0.173 -.0868655 .0156498 
education .0274676 .0312183 0.88 0.379 -.0337191 .0886542 
ages -.0026924 .0046444 -0.58 0.562 -.0117951 .0064104 
livelihooh -.0015437 .0177176 -0.09 0.931 -.0362695 .0331822 
female .243937 .0685372 3.56 0.000 .1096066 .3782674 
_cons .6156173 .276734 2.22 0.026 .0732286 1.158006 
Note: Probit analysis: Number of obs=1639 
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 Testing the risk preferences didn’t show significant differences on the basis of demographic 
factors (personal income, education and ages) except the gender. It turns out female are 
significantly more risk averse than man, that one more time indicates female as vulnerable 
group considering potential inadequacy in retirement savings. 
It is easy to notice both experiment 2 and 3 have the same purpose to test the attitude towards 
risk investment, but with different approach (frames).The risk insurance analysis is related to 
risk towards potential loss and latter one connected to potential gains. 
6.2.4. Loss aversion 
We saw that over 40% of the sample demonstrated unwillingness towards insurance price 
therefore people showed they would rather gamble with the potential loss than to pay and 
secure invested money. That means people who didn’t wish to pay insurance expressed risk 
seeking behaviour which lead us to believe that the same responders will show the same 
behaviour in experiment 3 (risk preferences).That was my next task, to test for the risk 
preferences those who were reluctant to premium prices. 
 
Figure 6.13: Risk attitude of those who don't want to pay insurance 
The results are contradictory looking at the Figure 6.13 where actually individuals who didn’t 
wish to pay for the insurance are predominantly risk averse. Why? By intuition we could 
expect greater percentage of risk seekers among these responders.  
The answer lies in key concept of the prospect theory already observed in second chapter. 
This analysis just confirmed what many researchers have proved before that people don’t 
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
40.00
extreme
risk
seeker
quite risk
seeker
low risk
seeker
low risk
aversive
quite risk
aversive
extreme
risk
aversive
Loss aversion 
do not wish to buy insurance
60 
 
 process information in such a rational way. Back to the behavioural economics, Kahneman 
and Tversky came up with the prospect theory, saying that people value losses and gains 
differently. Losses are weighted more heavily than an equivalent amount of gains, or we can 
say people experience stronger the pain of losing than joy of gaining the same amount of 
money. The implication is that they are ready to settle for some reasonable level of gains - 
risk averse (even there is chance to earn more), but also are willing to engage the risk-seeking 
behaviour in situation where they can limit their losses. Since potential investors are not 
aware of this behaviour, institutions, knowing the weaknesses of individuals, can take 
advantage of it. We can see through one example how that can be possible. 
If one investor was offered with the same mutual fund but from different bank advisors the 
choice will depend on presentation of product. The first advisor described the mutual fund 
with an average return of 7% over the past five years. The second advisor told investor that 
mutual fund has been producing above average return in the past 10 years but recent years 
have been observed in declining returns. Based on prospect theory, investor will more likely 
choose the first advisor over the second one even though it is about the same product11. That 
actually gives the space to financial institutions to manipulate and shape the products in a way 
that is more attractive and preferable for investors hiding the information of the crucial matter. 
As Dan Ariely said: ’We are not only irrational, we can be predictable irrational!’ 
The responders behaved as a risk averse, near 70% of participants would rather settle for 
safe amount than go for the gamble, but when it comes to losses they become riskier. They 
didn’t find necessary to pay for the insurance and secure their deposit (over 40%).People 
look at the insurance as pure loss and if there is a chance of not paying the same and still not 
losing the deposit they would go for that scenario and in that way reflect typical irrational 
behaviour. Results also showed that women are more risk averse than men. There is 
significant fraction of responders who didn’t know what to pay for the insurance but that % 
decrease with increasing the education, ages and mathematical skills. 
Beside behavioural biases, investment decisions are prone to framing effects. People don’t 
like percentage frames. When insurance was presented in percentages they expressed more 
unwillingness to pay for such insurance and more confusion (answer-‘do not know’) than in 
case where insurance was in absolute values. 
11 http://www.independentinvestor.info/content/view/966/236/1/2/ 
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 6.3. Choice of saving products 
The main objective of the experiment 1 is to test consumer’s ability to make retail investment 
decisions. Some demographic groups will be identified as better decision makers and 
weaknesses in process of making decisions will be observed. Responders will show if they are 
capable to recognize the lowest priced product or in other words, the one with the highest 
effective return. On their way of making decisions, they can express either cognitive 
limitations or some of the behavioural biases. Even though investment alternatives in the 
experiment are simplified version of investment products in reality, it reflects credible picture 
of investments with the fee structure of the most common products in retail investment 
market. The group of 75 different investment options are categorised in 25 sets and each of 
the responders have been assigned with three random investment sets. (Table 6.8-example of 
the first three choice sets with fee structure of investment choice and balance amount at the 
end of the 10 year saving period) 
Table 6.8: Example of Investment alternatives-fee structure and final balance amount 
Choice set Alternative Start Yearlig Percent Year 10 
1 1 0 0 0.01 124514.5 
1 2 5000 750 0 114490 
1 3 2500 250 0.02 111241.4 
2 1 1250 1000 0.01 110694.8 
2 2 3750 750 0.005 113216.7 
2 3 2500 250 0 124851.2 
3 1 5000 250 0.01 114154.2 
3 2 1250 750 0.015 110393.6 
3 3 3750 1000 0 113381.6 
Note: Experiment 1(Choice of saving products) 
Estimates of the balances at the end of year t are done as follows: 
It = (10000 – x)(1 + r)(1 – y) - z for t = 1 
It = (It-1+10000)(1 + r)(1 – y) - z for t > 1 
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 where It represents the balance amount at the end of year t, x is the start-up fee, r is the 
interest rate at 5%, y is the percentage fee and z is the annual fee. Percentage fee and the 
annual fee deducted either at the end of each year. 
My goal is to recognise the most vulnerable groups, or whether particular socio-economic 
group is less able to make right decision and what kinds of fee structure of the investment 
makes them mistakable. In order to get the answers on those questions, we will compare the 
balance amount at the end of the ten year saving period of selected option and best option in 
each set and that difference will be indicator of the sub-optimal decision and dependent 
variable of following regression analysis. 
6.3.1.  Who makes mistakes? 
Before we start analysing the groups who make worse or better investment decisions I would 
like to present general figures showing how responders from the sample are successful in 
selecting the best option (Figure 6.14) 
 
Figure 6.14: Success in selection the best choice in percentages 
In order to find out whether differences in gender, education, personal income, occupation 
and ages influence decision making, I will first apply some descriptive statistics and then by 
linear regression try to expose marginal effects and significance of each of the corresponding 
factors. 
Several times through my observations we could notice gender difference in investments 
attitude in general. It turns out again that female on average have greater loss compare with 
male therefore make worse decisions.(Figure 6.15) 
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Figure 6.15: An average loss distributed by gender (NOK) 
Men have NOK 2898 and women NOK 3400 average loss made by selecting the wrong 
choice. When it is about investing in future, men and women may not be on equal footing. 
Women generally spend lees working years and on average earn less than men which means 
lower pension and social security benefits. That means women may need to invest more 
aggressively and be even less fallible when it comes to the investing. In addition women have 
longer life expectancies and starting to contribute as early as possible is one of the condition 
for longer retirement12.  
In a line with my expectations, higher educated people perform on average better than those 
with lower education. It doesn’t have to be default, but the fact is that highly educated 
individuals are more able to process information and understand the issue which proves 
cognitive skills as important in investment decision making. 
 
Figure 6.16: An average loss distributed by education (NOK) 
Very interesting findings are related to responders’ occupation and how their working status 
influence quality of selected investment choice (Figure 6.17) 
12 Source, internet: http://www.axa-equitable.com/ 
2600.00
2800.00
3000.00
3200.00
3400.00
3600.00
Mann Kvinne
Average loss in NOK: gender 
3909.39 
3383.71 3170.08 
2583.86 
primary school high school directed high school university
Average loss in NOK: education 
64 
 
                                                 
  
Figure 6.17: An average loss distributed by occupation (NOK) 
I would like to discuss the result that obviously stands out and refers to self-employed group. 
People who have their own business showed the best results in selecting the optimal 
investment options. It might be possible that entrepreneurs have the least average loss since 
they are dealing with the costs and financial planning very often. Being directly involved in 
operating the business they developed numerical skills and improved decision making in 
general. 
Regressing the average loss on already mentioned independent variables we are getting even 
more transparent interpretation of how each of the socio-economic factors influence making 
optimal decision keeping other factors constant. 
Table 6.9: An average loss vs. socio-economic factor 
averageloss Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
personal income -120.6606 44.14165 -2.73 0.006 -207.198 -34.12316 
Education-primary school 
      
2-high school -661.6599 211.0861 -3.13 0.002 -1075.483 -247.8366 
3-directed high school -1154.204 232.4127 -4.97 0.000 -1609.837 -698.5708 
4-university -1836.966 274.0554 -6.70 0.000 -2374.238 -1299.695 
Livelihood-self employed 
      
2-full time 710.6301 259.3129 2.74 0.006 202.2606 1219 
3-part time 354.6704 306.4178 1.16 0.247 -246.0457 955.3865 
2394.53 
3006.44 
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 4-unemplyed 858.534 295.5443 2.90 0.004 279.1349 1437.933 
5-housewife 424.3843 632.5884 0.67 0.502 -815.7723 1664.541 
6-pensioner 1671.114 416.6492 4.01 0.000 854.2949 2487.933 
7-other 1537.554 437.2764 3.52 0.000 680.2964 2394.811 
ages 9.064555 7.519725 1.21 0.228 -5.677474 23.80658 
female 412.914 114.4052 3.61 0.000 188.6287 637.1994 
_cons 3035.72 530.133 5.73 0.000 1996.422 4075.018 
Note:Linear (OLS) regression ; Number of obs=4917 
Reading the results from the table we can say that higher income individuals made better 
decisions, specifically, one point increase of personal income decrease average loss for NOK 
120. Following the education we see gradually decreasing average loss with the increasing the 
education, therefore the university educated individuals have decreased average loss for NOK 
1836 in compare with the lowest educated group. Female significantly did worse than male 
population and increased on average the loss for NOK 413. As we’ve already observed, self-
employed people have made the least mistakes and that can show the table with significant 
result in points-2, 4, and 6. in the table. That means for instance that compare with the self-
employed individual, being the full time worker increase the average loss for NOK 710 the 
same with unemployed(NOK 858) and pensioners (NOK 1671 ). It is indicative that people 
get used to be protected and provided either by state (social and other benefits) or employers 
(defined-benefit scheme).That is why current retiree who spent all their working period 
without questioning their retirement income adequacy or workers under defined benefit plan 
who didn’t have burden of uncertainty now struggle and have less chance to invest smart than 
group who rely on and develop their own skills.  
6.3.2. Why do they make mistakes? 
The primary goal of answering this question is not supposed to uncover numerical or 
calculation abilities of individuals. Many of the investment options require high mathematical 
skills to be resolved in short time so it would be unrealistic to expect from responders to know 
resulted balances at the end of the saving period. Analysing the selected choices of responders 
I was trying to figure out the pattern of their answers and what makes them to end up with 
wrong alternative. You may compare fee structure of the saving products and if someone 
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 relies on mathematical logic he will be closer to the right answer, but if you let yourself to be 
ruled by behavioural biases than most likely you will regret. 
My intuition regarding procedure of selecting the optimal investment option guided me to the 
possible myopic behaviour, loss aversion and difficulties with the percentages fees, therefore I 
compared the answers on investment sets with special characteristics (fees structure).One 
group of investment set that I observed was with the highest start-up fee but the best outcome 
at the end of ten year saving period. Before I compare the results of this group with the results 
of other investment set groups I will provide how actually fees structure influence possible 
loss or sub-optimal decision by next regression: 
Table 6.10: The impact of fee structure on average loss 
averageloss Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
start up fee 333.7624 32.21755 10.36 0.000 270.6027 396.9221 
yearly fee 862.4677 35.07971 24.59 0.000 793.697 931.2384 
percentage fee 833.6121 33.9146 24.58 0.000 767.1256 900.0987 
_cons 179.2909 91.72184 1.95 0.051 -.5216353 359.1035 
Note: OLS regression; Number of obs=5304 
Table shows that one unit (0,005%) increase of percentage fee causes increase of average loss 
for NOK 834 in same way one unit (NOK 250) of yearly fee leads to increase of NOK 862 
and unit (NOK 1250) of start-up fee results with the increase of NOK 334.That means that 
responders were supposed to be far more concerned with yearly and percentage fee than with 
the start-up fee since their impact on selected option is much more significant. But how they 
actually behave? As already mentioned I compared the success in choosing the right option 
between two different groups of investment sets ( Figure 6.18) 
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Figure 6.18: Success of making decisions in two groups of investments 
As we could see significantly less number of responders found optimal investment option in 
group of investment set where options with highest start-up fee result as best alternative. If we 
break down these two comparative groups related to education and income we get the results 
from the Figures 6.19 and 6.20. 
 
Figure 6.19: Success of making decisions in two groups of investments distributed by education 
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Figure 6.20: Success of making decisions in two groups of investments distributed by personal income 
Both graphs show that on all levels of education and income greater success in selecting the 
optimal option have responders who were not dealing with the investment sets that have 
highest start-up fee and best effective return. 
These results can be interpreted as myopic behaviour where individuals are not able to see and 
to act according the nature of investment (10 year binding period) but perceive start up fees as 
instant loss therefore as the most important feature of saving product. With that said we can 
confirm again high sensitivity towards losses that in this case blurs the other parameters in fee 
structure which are of the greater impact on final balanced amount. As we could see from 
regression just 0,005% of percentage fee increase causes almost three times higher loss than 
increase of NOK 1250 in start-up fee. The responders might be aware that the options with the 
highest start-up fee in the first couple of years most likely have less balance amount than 
other options but obviously not aware that lower percentage fee with the other alternatives at 
the end will overcome that gap and possible result as the best option. Around 60% of 
individuals who have selected wrong choice just reflect the problem they have with the 
percentage fees and its calculation. If we in addition consider compounding interest rate and 
respective percentage fee than the problem even becomes more complicated and final 
outcome less transparent. Start-up fee will be calculated up front just once but percentage fee 
will compound annually during 10 year period which gives explanation of its huge effect on 
balance amount at the end of the saving period. That indicates importance of knowing the 
basic economic principles, numerical skills but also the transparency of financial institutions. 
42.11 43.78 43.54 45.45 41.07 
54.55 
64.85 
70.50 67.80 
73.74 77.10 
83.23 
Under 200 200-299 300-399 400-599 600-799 over 800
NOK in thousands 
start up fee other fee
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 The participants of the survey were assigned with the three random investments sets. Just 
30.94% of the sample was unmistakable and selected best choice in all three sets.. There is 
one third of chance that 36.37% of responders will always make the best choice while 8.99% 
individuals should be concerned since they made all three mistakes. Men, people with higher 
education and personal income and entrepreneurs have greater chance to make optimal 
investment decisions. 
The main obstacle was the fee structure of the investment sets where options with the highest 
start-up fee have the best effective return. Responders were short sighted, selecting the lower 
start-up fee over the higher percentage fee expressing again difficulties and bad 
understanding of the costs in percentage form. 
6.4. Validity, Limitations, Further research 
Data obtained from the survey serve as a base for all my inferences. In order to trust my 
conclusions as reliable and valid, I will briefly expose some of the characteristic of web 
survey as a method of collecting the data and some limitations regarding results extracted 
from the survey.  
Web designed surveys are flexible and effective. Less expensive method and short time frame 
for collection data justify growing number of electronically administered surveys over past 
several years. Easy transfer data into a data-base, cost saving and convenience for the 
responders are just some of the features of on line surveys13. 
One of the main concerns of the web surveys is related to external validity that is foundation 
of every good experimental design. The main criterion of the external validity is the process 
of generalization, and whether results obtained from a sample group can be extended to make 
prediction about the entire population. 
As noted earlier, representativeness of the results in web survey might be jeopardized since 
on-line population in most countries differ from the general population. Internet penetration in 
Norway is around 93% so we can say that selection bias is avoided and sample has randomly 
recruited responders14.  
13 http://wybowiersma.net/pub/essays/Wiersma,Wybo,The_validity_of_surveys_online_and_offline.pdf 
14 http://www.mvfglobal.com/scandinavia 
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 In survey like this designer have to be sure that questions are understandable, unequivocal and 
focused to extract valuable information for further researching. That means it is supposed to 
be simple as possible but at the same time reflect real investment market conditions. Some 
responders found the survey quite difficult even I think it is simplified version of the tasks 
that they can face in the market environment. Even though most of the questions are very 
clear and transparent there is still room for improvement.  
One of the treats of web survey is bias from self-reported answer. Fortunately experience 
from other on line surveys showed not big effect from this bias and I don’t see the reason that 
some of the answers were not objective in my survey. 
It is hard to say how good results from the experiments testing risk attitude, reflect real 
behaviour. We could assume that one would be more cautious if deals with real money than 
hypothetical, but on other hand that would mean that they could be just more risk averse and 
that doesn’t change overall conclusion. 
Finally, monetary incentives for responders are low and they do not spend vast amount of 
time on their hypothetical decisions therefore we shouldn’t over-interpret the level effects that 
I found.  
There are no reasons to believe that the behavioural biases I found would not matter in real 
life. If such systematic deviations (myopic behaviour, loss aversion, framing effects) occur in 
these stylised and simple situations it would be naïve to believe they would not occur in more 
complex real-life situations. 
The issues of pension reforms, retail investment market and capability of individual to 
respond on the actual problems are too broad therefore further research might capture 
different areas. If the sore spot is investment retail complexity and diagnosis is cognitive 
constraints and behavioural biases than only logical next step is medication. That means I 
would like to see further research questions related to effects of policy measures on quality of 
making the decision and overall pension system improvement. 
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7. CONCLUSION  
 
Implementation of pension reforms in Norway will get its full power and purpose in years to 
come. In order to make it happen for the benefits of current and future generations, 
strategically formed system chain between government, financial institutions, employers and 
employees is inevitable. 
If we start from the last link in the chain, we should ask ourselves whether potential investors 
are able to make optimal investment decisions on his/her own and to cope with the challenges 
imposed by increasingly complicated financial markets. If the answer is yes and individuals 
are confident players in retail investment markets than conducting the reforms is less painful. 
But what is the reality? Research evidence from my experiment tells that around 70% of the 
responders have at least one mistake in selecting the best investment option given three 
investments sets. We should bear in mind I didn’t manipulate with the fee structure in order to 
trigger all described behavioural biases but when I did it with the sets where highest start-up 
fee option has the best balance outcome, responders showed vulnerability and inconsistence in 
the answers. Building the trust in financial institutions is supposed to be a foundation for 
further improvements in the retail investment market, but the survey showed that people are 
not confident in financial industry. They are risk averse and almost 40% of my sample is 
insecure in adequacy of retirement income. The way how investment alternatives were 
presented strongly influences individual’s decision. 
It is hard to believe based on research evidence that Norwegians are well prepared for the 
challenges of the new pension system. Reality is not different. The Norwegian Air Shuttle and 
airline Widerøe employees are just some of the cases ended up at the court claiming the old 
pension rights.15 Those reactions are more than expected even Government’s actions are 
planned for the benefit of current and future generations. But somebody missed the fact that 
pensions system in Norway is in transition and that means patience and strategically well 
organised adaptation program. 
 Nobody can expect a new-born baby to walk after two weeks. She needs to practice, to 
become strong and confident than parents will be happy to witness her first steps. 
15 http://www.newsinenglish.no/2013/06/06/norwegian-air-loses-pensions-trial/ 
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 Analogically, it is important to regulate the investment retail market, increase transparency, 
organize educational campaigns, build up teams of expertise who would be responsible for 
default funds considering different preferences, provide incentives for saving programs, 
simplify enrolment and finally protect the pension rights. That leads to the term of Libertarian 
Paternalism. Libertarian aspect is supposed to give people freedom to do what they like- to 
opt out of undesirable arrangements if they want to do so. Paternalistic aspect of strategies lies 
in the claim that it is legitimate for the choice architect to steer people’s behaviour in the 
direction to improve their lives (Thaler & Sunstein 2008). 
The retirement landscape is changing and the retail investment world is not a quiet, pleasant 
place where asset managers efficiently manage investment portfolios for their clients. 
Financial innovation changed that and made pension reforms even harder to conduct. Days 
are numbered when most Norwegian workers could rely on employers to manage their 
retirement savings. Despite all the challenges, with the regulation of retail investment market 
and paternalistic approach of the government, no reason to question consumer’s potential to 
handle their portfolio themselves and enjoy well-deserved pensions. 
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